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 4 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The parliamentary system under the Saint Lucian constitution is not fulfilling its 
purpose as intended, due to its perverse application, resulting in multiple abuses 
which can only be cured by a revision of that model to a hybrid parliamentary 
presidential one.  
 
Many commonwealth countries throughout the world, and indeed many 
Caribbean countries share a common parliamentary system, entrenched in their 
constitution, handed down by Britain. This Westminster system has been 
working for the British people since its Reform Act of 1832. In the last 30 years, 
as Caribbean countries began to assert themselves internationally there came a 
desire to move away from colonial rule to a more perfect independence, marked 
in large part by the replacement of a parliamentary system with a constitutional 
monarchy, to a parliamentary republic with a constitutional president.  
 
These reforms by neighbouring Caribbean countries, together with the 
disenfranchisement felt by the people of Saint Lucia have fuelled the initiative for 
constitutional reform which officially commenced in 2004 and ended with the 
report of the Constitutional Reform Committee of 2011.1 
 
In Saint Lucia there have been serious issues raised by the electorate in the 
Westminster constitution which can be said to be due to the Parliament’s failure 
to apply it as it was intended, and/or, that it no longer serves the best interests of 
the country, which has evolved both economically and politically over the last 37 
years, following independence.  
 
As a result, the electorate have felt and continue to feel a growing disconnect 
with the constitution, believing that once persons are elected to office they no 
longer have the power to influence these decision makers, due, primarily, to the 
                                                        
1 Report of Saint Lucia Constitutional Reform Commission (August 2015) [Online]. (URL: 
http://www.govt.lc/media.govt.lc/www/resources/publications/FINAL%20REPORT%2030-03-
2011.pdf) hereinafter  ‘the Report’ 
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overwhelming amount of power which is seen to reside in the Cabinet and its 
Prime Minister. 
 
In Saint Lucia, the parliamentary process is governed by the Constitution Order 
of 1978 and the Standing Orders of the House of Assembly 1979. These establish 
the manner in which the framers of the constitution envisaged the Parliament 
would operate so as to reap maximum reward for the people in the realisation of 
a system based on “merit, ability and integrity,”2 which would guarantee a 
meritocracy, wherein, “the operation of the economic system [would] result in the 
material resources of the community being distributed so as to subserve the 
common good….”3 It is clear from the Report that this has not been the outcome 
that was foreseen.  
 
This dissertation will prove that there now lies, in the application of the 
constitution, serious deficiencies, which give rise to the concerns of the 
electorate and which have led to “widespread belief that [the] constitution 
condemns us to a situation in which our governments, once elected seem beyond 
our ability to restrain or to influence.”4 This deficiency has come about primarily 
because of the abuse of the constitutional process in “overwhelmingly 
concentrating power in the hands of a small cabinet” out of which all its attendant 
problems have emerged.5  
 
To prove this hypothesis the following methodology will be followed: 
 
 Chapter 1 will examine the parliamentary system in Saint Lucia based on 
the Westminster model, highlighting how it is intended to operate. 
 
                                                        
2 Constitution of Saint Lucia, Cap. 1.01 of the Revised Edition of the Laws of Saint Lucia 2001, 
preamble, para. (f), 
3 Ibid  
4 Supra fn.1, p. 24 
5 Ibid 
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 Chapter 2 will set out the main issues concerning the Saint Lucian 
electorate regarding the parliamentary system which has given rise to the 
call for reform as outlined in the Report. 
 
 Chapter 3 will critically examine the advantages and disadvantages of the 
current Westminster model in Saint Lucia and the Washington/Republic 
model of government, and, in so doing, this discourse will look at the 
Caribbean countries of Dominica, Guyana and Trinidad and Tobago in 
examining their objectives for reform, the mischief it was intended to 
cure, if any, and whether those objectives have been achieved and can be 
used as a predictor for the outcomes expected in Saint Lucia.  
 
 Chapter 4 will contrast the findings made in chapter 3 with the proposed 
parliamentary presidential model. 
 
 Chapter 5 will discuss whether the recommendations made in the Report 
best suit the current needs of the country and what other 
recommendations can be made to improve the constitutional design. 
Other than the Report, there have been no other extensive reports or writings on 
this subject-matter in Saint Lucia. Consequently, there will be a limit to the use of 
abundant tangible resources to be relied upon, particularly in the assessment of 
the model proposed which will be unique to Saint Lucia, if implemented. The 
main source will accordingly be the 2011 Report which is extensive in its 
examination and recommendations based on a wide pool of data obtained 
through interviews with Saint Lucians across the diaspora. The information 
obtained from the Report will be supplemented by interviews with former 
parliamentarians with experience working within the parliamentary system as 
well as relevant legislation, articles and texts touching and concerning the 
constitutional context in general.  
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“The good or bad fortune of a nation depends on three factors: its constitution, the 
way the constitution is made to work, and the respect it inspires.”6 In that 
statement we can see the major elements that are necessary for good 
governance.  
 
While the craftsmanship of the document is important, it cannot stand alone to 
assure its citizens of the equality and liberty that is theirs, for the document is 
mere paper and ink. In the end, it will be how that document is made to work 
which will guarantee those rights, for it will ultimately be men who will 
determine the path that will be taken and which will consequently raise the 
stature of the document to which men will feel beholden.  
 
The world’s first written constitution, the Bible, reveals its power, not purely in 
its words but in the lives lived out through that Word; by the men who went 
before and after it and who lived to testify to its efficacy and who brought love, 
peace and freedom to the people who desired it. The Bible is said to be the living 
word of Christ and continues to inspire even the dauntless, because it is not 
inactive, but continues, even 2000 years after Christ to bear relevance, and, 
through its Shepherds, promotes and gives the freedoms it promises. This is how 
constitutions are meant to work. This is how constitutions inspire, for it is men 
who will bring to life that living, breathing organ within that document. If they 
suffocate it, if they abuse it, if they treat it with scant respect it will no more be 
worth the paper that it is written on.     
 
For most of her young life Saint Lucia has lived, as a ward, at the ends of her 
mother’s apron strings following independence in 1979 with generous economic 
arrangements by way of trade preferences and aid.7 It was therefore no surprise 
that upon independence Saint Lucia would have opted for the safe haven of the 
                                                        
6 Georges Bidault, Prime Minister of France 1948 and 1958  
7 N. Girvan, “Assessing Westminster in the Caribbean: then and now” p.102 [Online] (URL: 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/14662043.2014.993162)    
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Westminster British model of government.8 While it was an easy transition from 
a colonial past over-seered by the Masters which gave the country some insight 
into the workings of the British system it was not, as Jack Straw has said of the 
unwritten constitution of Britain, a constitution that exists “in the hearts and 
minds and habits” of the people “as much as it does in the law.”9 How could a 
fledgling democracy hope to garner to herself centuries of understanding born 
out of years of an almost haphazard development from Magna Carta in 1215 to 
EEC membership in 1973? How could an island steeped in slavery and 
colonialism hope to understand a system premised on the notion of a free 
Englishman? When life starts out with the expectation that you are free and all 
things will come in time through patience and evolution it engenders a different 
world perspective and belief that hard work and effort will get you to the finish 
line. When life starts with the expectation that no matter how hard you work or 
how much effort you expend you will never reach the finish line, your world 
perspective becomes about gathering and fighting for your survival even within 
a civilized, free society.  
 
Montesquieu speaks to the fact that democracies can be corrupted in two ways: 
1. By “the spirit of inequality,” and  
2. By “the spirit of extreme equality.”10 
 
He espouses the view that the former occurs (the latter not being of moment for 
present purposes) where citizens no longer feel an affinity with the interests of 
their country and consequently seek only to advance their own personal desires 
at the expense of their fellow citizens and to acquire political power over them.11 
                                                        
8 R. Elgie, “Checks and Imbalances: Executive Design and Political Stability,” p. 1 [Online] (URL: 
http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/13276/checks-and-imbalances-executive-design-
and-political-stability)  
9 N. Morris, “The Big Question? Why doesn’t the UK have a written constitution, and does it matter?” 
[Online] (URL: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/the-big-question-why-doesnt-
the-uk-have-a-written-constitution-and-does-it-matter-781975.html)  
10 The Baron was considered one of the ‘great political philosophers of the Enlightenment’ and 
his most famous writing ‘The Spirit of the Laws’ (1748) Book XI, Chp. 6 entitled “Of the 
Constitution of England” explained human laws and social institutions. He has been widely 
credited with the doctrine of separation of powers. “Baron de Montesquieu” Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, p. 4 & 5 [Online] (URL: 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/montesquieu/ ) 
11 Ibid, p.4 
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To fully understand this doctrine one would have to reach back into that theory, 
where he first states that real democracy is unnatural to our passions and that 
the only way that it can flourish is where our personal ambitions are subsumed 
by a greater ambition, the virtue to serve ones country. To accomplish this feat, 
the power imposing democracy must educate the masses to show them how and 
why their interests must align with the interests of the state.12   
 
The value of this theory in the Saint Lucian context is to gain some insight into 
the difficulties encountered and still being encountered within the Westminster 
system. An inherited system, intended to gloss over a colonial past, with no re-
education from a slave mentality, under which men behaved in consonance with 
their natural passions, which could be said to have been “nasty and brutish,”13 for 
a seemingly civilized system that did not teach them, that its success was 
determined by converting those passions for the higher ideals of country first 
and self last, would inevitably conclude tragically.  
 
To appreciate the Westminster system it would be necessary to look back into 
history at its development in order to see how its systems came about and why 
they came about as they did. This would give a comprehensive overview into the 
workings of the British system and how it was therefore expected to work in the 
British colonies like Saint Lucia.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
12 Ibid 
13 T. Hobbs, “Of the Natural Condition of Mankind as concerning their felicity and Misery” (1588-
1679) [Online] (URL: http://www.bartleby.com/34/5/13.html)   
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CHAPTER 1 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
Quite before the 8th Century, Britain was always ruled by Kings, whose word 
was the law and his acts above reproof, but from about the 8th to the 11th century 
one could see the emerging’s of what would later become the Westminster 
Parliament, in which the King would seek advice of his nobles14 on issues 
affecting the country. And though the nobility did not make the laws, but merely 
consented to those which the King had ultimately decided to pass, it became 
clear to the King that if he wished to continue to enjoy the favour of these nobles 
in the territories which they governed, without contest, he had to find a way to 
balance his power with theirs.  
 
Following the Norman Conquest, successive Kings began to rule with permanent 
inner councils made up of nobles and churchmen and others selected by the King 
from whom he would seek approval, particularly on matters of taxation. They 
became known as the Great Council,15 forming what would later become known 
as the House of Lords. Here we begin to see the symbiotic relationship between 
the King and his council developing.  
 
The Barons, whom the King relied on for loyalty and support to foster unity in 
his territories, began to feel oppressed by the excessive taxation of King John 
which became the catalyst that birthed the Magna Carta and effectually reined in 
the power of the King, and definitively stated that the King and his government 
were not above the law,16 thereby placing the law above the power of the King, 
which effectively meant limiting that power so as to prevent any future 
exploitation of it to the detriment of the kingdom.17  
                                                        
14 This group of leading advisors and nobles were known as the Witan and only offered up this 
advice when particularly summoned by the King. “Birth of the English Parliament; Anglo-Saxon 
origin” [Online] URL: http://www.parliament.uk/about/living-
heritage/evolutionofparliament/originsofparliament/birthofparliament/overview/origins/  
15 Ibid 
16 Ibid, Magna Carta  
17 How did Magna Carta come about? [Online] (URL: https://www.parliament.uk/about/living-
heritage/evolutionofparliament/originsofparliament/birthofparliament/overview/magnacarta/
 11 
 
From 1275 the first parliament was called, made up of noblemen and churchmen 
with two representatives from each county and two from each town. Their 
primary role was to approve the King’s plan for taxation. It later developed that 
those who were most affected by any intended taxation regime had to first give 
their consent to the parliament.18  
 
It would appear therefore that the origins of parliament came out of a need to 
impose taxation on the populace to fund the King’s wars and the parliament 
began to use this need of the King to present their own requests. The 
consequence was therefore, that the King would have to weigh his need for the 
imposition of this tax against the favour requested of parliament, which 
essentially acted as a check on the demands of the King. Here again may be 
observed a second symbiotic relationship between the King and His parliament. 
From then on, the parliament was always made up of the Lords, The Commons 
and the Monarch.19  
 
When Edward III came to the throne in 1327 he declared that the parliament 
should meet annually, and by the 14th century, both the Lords and the Commons 
felt that their role should be more than consenting to the taxation requests of the 
King.20  
 
The year 1376 saw the rise of a Speaker of the Commons who would act as the 
spokesman for the Lords before the King.21 As the power of the Commons grew, 
they initiated an impeachment process to prosecute the King’s corrupt Ministers 
and later the Lord Chancellor.22 In 1407, the King officially confirmed the right of 
                                                                                                                                                              
magnacartahow/) and R. Blackburn, “Magna Carta: Britain’s unwritten 
constitution”[Online](URL: http://www.bl.uk/magna-carta/articles/britains-unwritten-
constitution)  
18 Supra, fn.15, “Edward I”  
19 Ibid  
20 Ibid, “Rise of the Commons” 
21 Ibid 
22 Ibid 
 12 
the Commons to initiate all money grants, a right which they have retained to 
this day.23  
 
The Commons also acquired the equal standing to make laws and over time 
became the principal initiators of bills to be presented to the Upper House24 
(House of Lords). By 1414 the power of the Commons began to grow through 
their insistence to the King that the wording of any bill should not be amended 
by Him or His Lords except with the consent of the Commons.25 By the 15th 
century, the Commons had secured the right to control the supply of money to 
the King.26 Slowly but surely, the sovereignty of the King was eroded and the 
sovereignty of Parliament grew. 
 
As time marched on there were more and more developments into the 
parliamentary system we know today. What became known as Henry VIII’s 
“Reformation Parliament”27 of 1529 to 1536 spectacularly changed the nature of 
parliament and government; arising primarily out of the King’s desire to divorce 
his then wife to marry Anne Boleyn so as to sire an heir. This move was 
frustrated by the Church of Rome and influential men like Sir Thomas Moore.28 
However, in his effort to secure the divorce, the King assumed power as the Head 
of the Church through parliament and began to make laws affecting all areas of 
life especially religious practice and doctrine.29 By taking away that authority 
from the Church the parliament effectually made itself “omnicompetent,”30 and 
thereafter set out to initiate a “programme of social, religious and economic 
reform.”31 This last stand by the King, together with Parliament, is a strong 
indicator of the power that parliament had now acquired, in all facets of 
governance.   
                                                        
23 Ibid, “The Commons as Law Makers” 
24 Ibid 
25 Ibid 
26 Ibid  
27 Ibid, “Reformation Parliament”  
28 G. B. Wegemer, “Thomas More: A Portrait of Courage” Scepter Publishers, Princeton 1950 
29 Supra fn. 27 
30 Ibid; An omnicompetent parliament now had overarching authority to make laws; the King 
acknowledging that his “Royal power was at its strongest when it was expressed through 
parliamentary statute.” 
31 Ibid 
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This brief foray into Britain’s historical past gives decisive insight into the 
lengthy processes that gave way to the Westminster system of today, which 
accounts for men, like Jack Straw, being able to say that the constitution of 
Britain is essentially written on the tablets of the hearts of the British people, 
because it has been instilled there through struggle and strife, and handed off 
from one generation to another to strengthen and to build upon from century to 
century. It is, as Prime Minister Asquith described in 1928 of Britain’s 
constitutional practices, not derived from any Bill emanating from the Commons 
or the Lords but “on usage, custom, convention, often of slow growth in their early 
stages, not always uniform, but which in the course of time received universal 
observance and respect.” 32 
 
As the Whitehall system now stands, it is recognised by the following features: 
its Head of State is the Monarch in theory, but in practice, the Prime Minister. 
The Prime Minister is a Minister but he enjoys the ranking of being first among 
equals and has the function of selecting his members of Cabinet out of the elected 
members of the House of Commons. The Prime Minister and his Cabinet 
thenceforth form the Executive branch of the government, with the elected 
members of the Commons forming the Legislative branch through which all laws 
must pass before moving on to the House of Lords. The parliament is made up of 
a number of committees that sit throughout the year scrutinising legislation that 
neither the Commons nor the Lords have the parliamentary time to devote to 
reviewing.  
 
Based on the British model, from its development to now, it is clear that the 
parliament’s initial purpose for being was to serve the almost hedonistic needs 
of its King. They were a façade. They gave the appearance of a sort of democracy 
before the eyes of the people, but more so, were intended by the King to woo his 
Lords and Nobles to do his bidding, particularly in money matters. Over time, the 
parliament began to realise the power they could wield over the King because of 
                                                        
32 Prime Minister of the United Kingdom: Constitutional Background, p. 3, [Online](URL: 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prime_Minister_of_the_United_Kingdom)  
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the lands they controlled and so began a relationship between them of give and 
take. Like a good wife, parliament knew when to yield and when to advance until 
it succeeded in becoming so powerful that Kings could no longer act without its 
nod of approval. Through the sweat of its brow the parliament crafted out its 
place, reined in the power of the King, including his power of veto which had, by 
then, fallen into disuse33 and acquired the equal footing to decide how the 
monies of the kingdom would be spent and the laws that would be passed. The 
role of the Lords was to assist the Commons to ensure that good and better laws 
were passed and the establishment of committees to scrutinise legislation more 
thoroughly. This guaranteed that parliament was always working and working 
efficiently.  
 
PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM IN SAINT LUCIA 
 
Saint Lucia shares all the same features with the British system, though on a 
much lesser scale. The marked difference between the two is in the manner in 
which legislation is scrutinised, the most important and the primary function of 
any Parliament.  
 
Currently, the number of constituencies represented in Saint Lucia’s House of 
Assembly (the Commons) stands at 17. Of the 11 seats won by the majority 
party, 10 of the elected have been selected by the Prime Minister to hold 
ministerial office alongside their parliamentary responsibilities. 4 additional 
members have been appointed as Ministers from the Senate, making a 15 
member Cabinet.34  
 
The Senate in Saint Lucia (the equivalent of the House of Lords) comprises 11 
Senators; 6 appointed by the Governor-General on the advice of the Prime 
Minister, 3 appointed by the Governor-General on the advice of the Leader of the 
Opposition, and 2 appointed by the Governor-General acting in her own 
                                                        
33 Ibid, p. 4 
34 House of Assembly, Saint Lucia [Online](URL: http://www.govt.lc/house-of-assembly)   
 15 
deliberate judgment.35 The three senators chosen for the Opposition are all 
former candidates in the last election.36 Of the 6 senators chosen for the 
government, 5 were former candidates in the last election. The Speaker of the 
House Leonne Theodore is a high-ranking member within the United Workers 
Party (the ruling party) and the President of the Senate Andy Daniel is a former 
candidate with the ruling party and a member within its executive.37 It is 
therefore clear that the parliament is not only controlled by the Executive but 
overwhelmingly so. In other words, the parliament would appear to be a mere 
puppet in the hands of the Executive.   
 
While the parliamentary model calls for ministers to be selected from members 
of the House, it is clear that this provision is only workable in a parliament like 
the United Kingdom which commands a far larger parliament with its 650 
elected members38 in comparison with a parliament of only 17. The cabinet of 
the UK39 boasts almost the same number as Saint Lucia and its remaining 
members of the House of Commons are utilised in the numerous committees set 
up to scrutinise legislation and oversee the workings of government. 
 
Pre-legislative and legislative scrutiny, a significant legislative mechanism 
recognised by parliaments around the world as crucial to good governance and 
the passage of better laws is ill-used by the Saint Lucia parliament, not because 
its value is unrecognised but, to strictly adhere to it would mean little 
opportunity for the majority party to bully its way through parliament.40 Further, 
the majority of the members of parliament, being, as stated above, ministers of 
government, are stymied in the contribution which they may otherwise make to 
the House through the use of its committees. 
                                                        
35 Supra fn. 2, S.24  
36 St. Lucia News Online, “SLP Names Senators” [Online](URL: 
http://www.stlucianewsonline.com/slp-names-senators/)  
37 St. Lucia News Online, “Andy Daniel Tipped to be New Senate President” [Online]URL: 
http://www.stlucianewsonline.com/andy-daniel-tipped-to-be-new-senate-president/ 
38 House of Commons; [Online] (URL: http://www.parliament.uk/business/commons/)  
39 There are currently 22 members of Cabinet: Cabinet Ministers, [Online] (URL: 
www.gov.uk/government/ministers) 
40 M. John-Theobalds, “The Causes and Effects of the deficiency in the Pre-Legislative and 
Legislative scrutiny processes in St. Lucia” [Online] (URL: http://sas-
space.sas.ac.uk/4712/1/Michelle_John_Theobalds_LLM_ALS_Dissertation.pdf)  
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In the UK, question time is frequently employed as a means for opposition 
members to demand accountability of the government in respect of its works 
and actions - to the parliament and ultimately the British people. It is an inherent 
part of the British parliamentary culture. In Saint Lucia, question time is rarely 
used and when it is, it is more often an opportunity for the majority party to 
gloss over or artfully avoid issues and attack other members of the House rather 
than address matters pointedly.41 
 
It is quite apparent therefore, that while Saint Lucia has all the vital organs of the 
Westminster system they have been so abused and maltreated as to be a 
“grotesque distortion of the original.”42  
 
SEPARATION OF POWERS 
Fundamental to any true democracy is the doctrine of the separation of powers. 
It would be impossible to discuss any model of government without reference to 
this doctrine. A doctrine first coined and attributed to Baron de Montesquieu.43  
 
This doctrine was posited on the belief, that “constant experience shows us that 
every man invested with power is apt to abuse it……it is necessary from the very 
nature of things that power should be a check to power.”44 In other words, those in 
the greatest positions of power could only have that power curtailed by persons 
with similar or greater power.  
 
In his writings, Montesquieu did not take credit for the formulation of the 
doctrine, it having evolved out of the British system. What he did was merely to 
give name to it and expound upon it from the perspective of a critic, holding out 
                                                        
41 Unpublished Interview: Cenac, Emmanuel Neville. Leader of the Opposition and Political 
Leader of the Saint Lucia Labour Party 1982-1987), Chairman of the Public Accounts Committee 
till 1982 and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Saint Lucia (1987-1992) and President of the Senate 
of Saint Lucia (1992 to 1997) and political commentator from 1997 to date. Interview with 
author. Skype. Vanuatu-Saint Lucia, July 28 and 30, 2016, August 1, 10, 14, 23 and 28, 2016 
42 Supra, fn. 7, p. 7 
43 Supra, fn. 10, p. 3 and 6 
44 Supra, fn. 10, p. 6 
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the British constitution as the criterion or “mirror of political liberty.”45 His 
meaning therefore could only be interpreted in the context of the evolution of 
that doctrine, from within the society and environment from which it developed. 
 
A look back into the development of the doctrine would quickly reveal that 
Montesquieu could not have intended that the three powers be kept separate 
and independent, for this was not what pertained in Britain. The executive was 
integrally connected to the legislature, in that while the executive could make 
treaties with foreign powers they could only have the force of law upon passage 
in the House. The executive appointed the judiciary and while it could remove 
the judiciary, that removal could only be effected through a joint order of the 
Houses.46 The House of Lords contained the highest appeal body to which cases 
of impeachment would come and the judges themselves often attended and 
participated in legislative sittings though they had no power of the vote.47 His 
meaning is aptly captured in the following: 
   
“There can be no liberty where the legislative and executive powers are united in 
the same person, or body of magistrates,” or “if the power of judging be not 
separated from the legislative and executive powers.”48 
 
“…that where the WHOLE power of one department is exercised by the same hands 
which possess the WHOLE power of another department, the fundamental 
principles of a free constitution are subverted.”49    
 
His vision - that the legislature alone should have the power to tax the people as 
this was the singular way to deprive the executive of funding should it choose to 
arbitrarily impose its will; and the executive should have the power to veto acts 
of the legislature; and the judiciary should be independent of both in their 
                                                        
45 Madison (1788), “Federalist No. 47,” p. 1-2, [Online] (URL: 
http://www.foundingfathers.info/federalistpapers/fed47.htm) 
46 Ibid 
47 Ibid, p. 2 
48 Ibid 
49 Ibid 
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application of the law which should be done in a fixed and consistent manner.50 
This doctrine had a profound impact on the framers of the United States 
constitution, which will be discussed in more detail at chapter 3. 
 
Montesquieu’s view can be likened to the Holy Trinity; three persons in one, but 
separate and distinct from the other. The legislature (the Father) from whence 
the Executive (the Son) derives its authority and the Judiciary (the Holy Spirit), 
which proceeds from the legislature, and the Executive. Consequently, 
Montesquieu saw no improper blending of the three but in fact recognised that 
the efficiency of government deemed it to be so. It did not appear therefore that 
the man who gave flesh to this doctrine truly believed or expected there to be a 
complete separation of powers. The better and seemingly more correct 
interpretation would be that he recognised that a literal and distinct separation 
was a legal fiction and could, as such, only be partial for the arms of government 
to be truly workable, accompanied by controls.51 As Walter Bagehot posits; “the 
peculiar excellence of the British Constitution lies in a balanced union of three 
powers.”52 It is not so much therefore that the powers be so distinctly separated 
but that each power is designated to separate bodies and neither has the right to 
impinge upon the work of the other.53 He in fact contends that the efficiency and 
merit of the English system is the “nearly complete fusion of the executive and 
legislative powers.”54  
 
CHECKS AND BALANCES IN THE PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM 
To understand the reality of the separation of powers it is incumbent to look to 
its complement controls.  
 
                                                        
50 Supra, fn. 10, p. 6 
51 G. Carney, “Separation of Powers in the Westminster System” p. 4 [Online] (URL: 
http://www.parliament.qld.gov.au/aspg/papers/930913.pdf)  
52 W. Bagehot, “The English Constitution” p. 23 [Online] (URL: 
http://www.gutenberg.org/files/4351/4351-h/4351-h.htm ) 
53 Ibid  
54 Ibid, p. 26 
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In the spirit of Montesquieu’s understanding of the doctrine we shall look at how 
each department in Britain operates on the basis of partial agency to control the 
other.   
 
As we have seen, the monarch retains sovereign power, albeit in name only, 
though the power enjoyed by the government comes through Her. While she may 
have a seat in government her power is now restrained to advising and warning, 
with a constitutional right to be kept informed.55  
 
The House of Commons (the legislature) is made up of elected members, and of 
that number the Queen, by convention, selects one member who is capable of 
commanding the support of the majority of the members of the House to be 
Prime Minister.56 The Prime Minister will thereafter be responsible for naming 
his cabinet (executive) out of those members who form the legislature.57 The 
members of the House of Lords (Senate) are nominated58 and usually have 
tenure.  
 
In the trinity of powers, it is self-evident that the Father must check the Son, and 
the Son and the Father, the Holy Spirit.59 If the primary and singular function of 
the legislature is to initiate and pass laws, how then does the system guarantee 
that there is not a return to the bygone era of Kings whose will and laws were 
legitimated without the murmur of the Assembly? It is through the oversight of 
the House of Lords who must scrutinise every bill that initiates from the 
Commons. The Lords have the power to amend and refuse to give their approval 
                                                        
55 Supra, fn. 33, p. 3  
56 Supra, fn. 2, S.60 (2)  
57 Ibid, subsection (3) & (4)  
58 Since the 1999 House of Lords Act lifetime peerages are no longer hereditary though lifetime 
peerages still exist and the number of peerages have been reduced to 92: “House of Lords 
Reform” [Online] (URL: http://www.parliament.uk/about/living-
heritage/evolutionofparliament/houseoflords/house-of-lords-
reform/overview/hereditarypeersremoved/). In Saint Lucia senators are appointed at the 
pleasure of the Prime Minister, the Leader of the Opposition and the Governor-General and may 
be removed at any time, Supra, fn. 35  
59 While parliamentary checks on the judiciary are limited, the parliament does have the 
authority to remove judges but only for gross misconduct: International IDEA, “Judicial Tenure, 
Removal, Immunity and Accountability.” [Online] (URL: 
http://www.constitutionnet.org/files/judicial_removal_0.pdf) 
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to bills.60 Committees set up to pointedly scrutinise legislation can further 
embolden the Lords to refuse to approve certain bills depending on the outcome 
of the reports from these committees.61  
 
The Commons, from whom the executive is pulled, acts as a check on the Prime 
Minister and his cabinet. The Commons is the first step in the scrutiny process. 
They can refer bills to the committees for more in-depth scrutiny, they can 
ferociously debate the merits of the law and highlight its defects in an effort to 
embarrass and/or move the executive to reconsider or recall the law.62 Question 
time is a “salutary discipline”63 for good governance and is an opportunity to 
place the Prime Minister and his Ministers on the spot regarding matters of great 
national import and demand details of transactions undertaken or being 
undertaken by the government,64 and the large numbers of members in both 
Houses assures little overlap of committee members and the guarantee that 
parliament is always working with the aim of passing better laws.  
 
With the exception of large numbers in both Houses and standard scrutiny 
committees, the system of checks in Saint Lucia is the same as that which 
pertains in the United Kingdom.  
 
Whether this time weathered system is adequate as a check on each branch will 
be examined in more detail at chapter 3.      
 
                                                        
60 Supra, fn. 2, S.50, The Senate has the power to reject or amend any bill except a money bill. 
Notwithstanding, the legislature may send a bill for the approval of the Governor-General if the 
bill has been rejected a second time by the senate and at least 6 months has elapsed between its 
1st passage through the House and its 2nd passage. This proviso is a failsafe way of ensuring that 
the Senate does not unnecessarily hold on to or delay bills.    
61 “The Work of the House of Lords” (2005-2006); In 2005 a private member’s bill “The Assisted 
Dying for the Terminally Ill” bill was proposed. A highly emotive subject, it was referred to a 
special select committee which report was debated in October 2005. This assisted in informing 
its second reading where an unprecedented vote was taken and the bill was defeated. 
[Online](URL: https://www.parliament.uk/documents/lords-information-
office/holwork0506.pdf)  
62 Ibid 
63 Professor Rhodra Reddock is a Professor of Gender, Social Change and Development and 
Deputy Campus Principal at the University of the West Indies, St. Augustine Campus and 
contributor to “Evolution of a Nation-Trinidad & Tobago at Fifty,” p. 43 [Online] (URL: 
http://www.ttparliament.org/documents/2183.pdf) 
64 Ibid, p. 43 and Supra fn. 33, p. 16 
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CHAPTER 2 
Reasons for Reform  
Separation of Powers 
The discontent of the electorate with the constitution of Saint Lucia appears to 
have arisen out of a restlessness with the political culture rife within the 
establishment, born out of the belief that they had transposed a system with its 
large parliament and small executive, defended by a healthy number of 
backbenchers into a country with a relatively small parliament, made up of only 
17 elected members and 11 nominated senators, with an often top heavy 
executive.65 Their overall discontent is evident in the apothegm statement: that 
the “overwhelming concentration of power in the hands of a small cabinet, was 
[seen as] an unacceptable situation which cried out for change.”66 The electorate 
disparagingly referred to themselves as window-shoppers, passively standing 
outside the storefront of government, unable to influence them once the election 
was won.67  
 
They felt that the executive had to be restrained, for the extent and expanse of 
their powers seemed too wide and too great. They believed that the time-
honoured discretion of the Prime Minister to name the date for elections placed 
the Opposition at a disadvantage and consequently the electorate.68 They 
believed that this latter power was often dangled before the Opposition parties 
and the electorate in an almost irreverent manner and hyped to the point of 
sensationalism; the seriousness of their franchise was degraded to a mere comic 
strip.  
 
Despotic Government 
For years, the people had been subjected to what they referred to as the 
victimisation by the government, headed by leaders who held on to power as 
                                                        
65 Supra fn. 1, p.23-24 
66 Ibid, p. 24 
67 Ibid 
68 Ibid, p. 25 
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long and however they could.69 The electorate thus called for term limits for the 
Prime Minister in an effort to avoid what they felt had been the tyranny of other 
Prime Ministers.70  
 
One leading politician offered up one of the many examples of this 
oppressiveness.71 He states that in 1971, prior to independence, when Saint 
Lucia was still an Associated State under the Premiership of John Compton, who 
later became its first Prime Minister, the Public Order Act72 was passed. Its intent 
was to quell freedom of expression and freedom of speech of the members, and 
leaders of the Opposition Saint Lucia Labour Party who were leading nationwide 
demonstrations against the government for the resignation of the Premier. The 
demonstrations were instigated by the act of the Premier in deporting a British 
citizen, Deborah Hatchet, who had spoken on the platform of the Opposition 
party. On account of the Premier’s majority in the House, the Act was passed in 
short order. It established a special, more aggressive branch of the police force to 
deal with dissident citizens and required permission to be sought for any future 
demonstrations, which essentially meant that members of the public would be 
disbarred from holding any future demonstrations as the Premier was seen to 
control the police force through its Commissioner73 and, therefore, the word of 
the Commissioner was the word of the Premier.   
 
In the Report, the people asked for easier access to the courts and/or other 
institutions to address abuses, human rights violations or breaches of the 
constitution, and felt that increasing the powers of the Opposition would 
                                                        
69 Supra fn. 41: Former Prime Minister Kenny D. Anthony had told the electorate when he first 
sought office that he would only serve a 2 year term as dictated by his party’s constitution 
[“Article X (g) of the Constitution and Rules of the St. Lucia Labour Party”]. Following his 2 terms 
when the electorate expected him to step down and defer to the Hon. Mario Michel, the 
incumbent Deputy, he instead sought to amend his party’s constitution to justify a 3rd and 4th 
term in office. As a result, he lost favour with the people and the incumbent Deputy subsequently 
left the party and did not seek re-election. 
70 Supra, fn. 68 
71 Supra fn. 41  
72 Cap. 14.05 of the Revised Laws of Saint Lucia 2001 
73 Supra, fn. 2, Under S. 94(1) of the Constitution the Commissioner is appointed by the Governor 
General on the advice of the Public Service Commission who must consult with the Prime 
Minister. If the Prime Minister has an objection the Commission will not advise the Governor 
General to appoint. 
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operate, in part, to limit the powers of the Prime Minister and his cabinet,74 
making the government more parliamentary focused. The people were aggrieved 
by what seemed a cavalier approach to selling, leasing or otherwise 
compromising property regarded as sacred by them. 75   
 
In short, the people felt that opportunities for them to participate in the process 
of government were limited to non-existent, and considered the government 
much too powerful; with no obligation to account to them.76 
 
In that regard, reference is made to what was referred to as the “Rochamel Affair” 
which arose under the then St. Lucia Labour Party administration. To facilitate 
the construction of a new hotel in St. Lucia, The Hyatt Regency, the Executive, 
through its Prime Minister, apparently unlawfully,77 agreed to guarantee a loan 
of US$20 million to the company prior to construction, without seeking the 
permission of the parliament to charge the consolidated fund. Following its 
completion, the company went bankrupt and into receivership. The government 
made no claim for the guaranteed loan and the country lost these monies. Aside 
from the devastating financial loss to the country, the then Prime Minister, Dr. 
Kenny Anthony, later came to parliament to obtain permission for these monies 
to be deducted from the consolidated fund. Permission was granted. The country 
was outraged because they felt that the Prime Minister had acted unilaterally in 
guaranteeing this loan, which monies were subsequently lost and for which 
parliament did not demand a thorough investigation. They felt that the Prime 
Minister had shown no remorse for the loss and had in fact misled the Nation.78  
 
                                                        
74 Supra fn. 1, p. 25 
75 Ibid, p. 28. There had arisen the issue of the government selling the Queen’s Chain which would 
mean that no Saint Lucian would be allowed to frequent any beach where the Queen’s Chain was 
privately owned: B. Williams, “The Queen’s Chain And Our Survival” The Star (Saint Lucia, 14 
February 2011) [Online]. (URL: http://stluciastar.com/the-queens-chain-and-the-strict-laws-of-
survival-for-us/)  
76 Supra, fn. 70 
77 Supra fn. 1, p. 29. It was contrary to the Finance Act and the Constitution to charge the 
consolidated fund without parliamentary approval first, D. Lebourne, “Finance Administration 
Act Amended” [Online](URL: http://stluciastar.com/finance-administration-act-amended/) and 
C. Barrow-Giles “Regional Trends in Constitutional Developments in the Commonwealth Caribbean” 
fn. 27 [Online] (URL: http://www.cpahq.org/cpahq/cpadocs/Cynthia%20Barrow.pdf )  
78 Supra fn. 41  
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The “Grynberg Affair” again implicated the then Prime Minister for having 
unilaterally entered into an arrangement with billionaire, Grynberg, to lease 53 
million acres of the sea-bed to scour for oil. The Prime Minister had, once again, 
committed the consolidated fund to payments; this time, to survey the sea-bed 
prior to the commencement of works by Grynberg. This arrangement had been 
in place for some 11 years and during that time neither the Governor General, 
nor the cabinet, nor the parliament nor the people were made aware of its 
existence.79  
 
It is therefore clear why the electorate have become so increasingly concerned 
with the power of Prime Minister’s and their cabinet.  
 
Parliamentary Corruption 
It was felt that political parties were allowed to run elections with no 
requirement to declare their source of funds.80 More and more the electorate 
was losing interest and confidence with what appeared to be flagrant exhibitions 
of corruption by parties and candidates, particularly during election campaigns, 
in their excessive and unaccounted for expenditure. The Report went on to state 
that there appeared to be no ethical standard required for elected officials in 
parliament 81  and no available means to recall dishonest or ineffective 
parliamentarians.82 
                                                        
79 Supra fn. 1, p. 28; R. Wayne, “Grynbery: Was Ausbert Suckered?”[Online](URL: 
https://stluciastar.com/grynberg-was-ausbert-suckered/Ibid) 
80 M. George, “UWP Chairman sued” (2014, February 1) [Online] (URL: 
http://www.thevoiceslu.com/local_news/2014/february/01_02_14/UWP.htm#sthash.nBBvDNC
m.dpuf). In Attorney-General of Saint Lucia v Allen Chastanet et al Claim No SLUHCV 2015/1035 
the Attorney-General claimed that Chastanet, while a Minister of the Government and a candidate 
for the UWP, requested, advised, received or expended or permitted or acquiesced in the receipt 
of the sum of EC$38,119.00 of public funds of the Soufriere town Council for the unlawful 
purpose of a campaign and political event for his personal and political benefit or the benefit of 
his political party, the UWP. The matter was summarily dismissed in part on the 26 May, 2015 
and thereafter reversed on appeal. [Online]. (URL: http://www.stlucianewsonline.com/breaking-
news-case-against-allen-chastanet-thrown-out-of-court/) and [Online] (URL: 
http://thevoiceslu.com/2016/07/chastanet-react-court-next-week/) 
81 Supra fn 1, p. 28; (1) R. Wayne, “Knowledge Crucial to Informed Decisions” [Online] (URL: 
http://stluciastar.com/knowledge-crucial-to-informed-decisions/) A former elected 
representative had misrepresented his credentials to the electorate that he had a PhD when he in 
fact did not. He was defended by his party the SLP and allowed to run a second term (2) 
Choiseul/Saltibus Press Release, [Online] (URL: http://choiseul-
inform.blogspot.com/2015/08/we-do-not-support-rufus-anymore.html) The Voice Newspaper, 
“Rufus Bousquet told: ‘Stay Away’” [Online] (URL: http://thevoiceslu.com/2015/08/rufus-
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Consequently, the people proposed a Presidential type system of government, 
similar to the United States or the creation of some hybrid of the two, where the 
presidential model could be grafted unto the existing parliamentary model 
creating a suitable system83 that would allow them to select a Prime Minister at 
large,84 and claim more direct access to participation in the political process.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
bousquet-told-stay-away/)  Rufus Bousquet was found to have had a criminal record in his youth 
in the United States which he never disclosed. When it was discovered the UWP did not demand 
his resignation from the party or the government nor did he opt to resign. He instead chose to 
run a second election.  
82 Ibid, p. 24; Supra fn. 77: SEE: Housing Minister and Health Minister scandal  
83 Supra, fn. 1, p. 26-27  
84 Ibid, p. 26-27 
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CHAPTER 3 
Westminster versus Washington 
For many democracies around the world discussions are now widespread 
regarding the best constitutional model for their country, that is, parliamentary, 
presidential or a hybrid of the two. Many who viewed the British model as the 
best there was, having endured for 800 years, now posit the view that it is 
characterised more by a lack of accountability than as a model of inclusiveness 
and justice of and for the people. This chapter will juxtapose the parliamentary 
model against that of the United States presidential model by concentrating 
largely on the relationship between the Executive and the Legislature. 
 
“The parliamentary system of government refers to a system of government having 
the real executive power vested in a cabinet composed of members of the 
legislature who are individually and collectively responsible to the legislature.”85 
 
It is a system where the three branches are intrinsically connected, where one 
derives its authority from the other and they all operate as a bar to abuse of each 
other. 
 
Under the parliamentary design the Queen in Britain or the Governor-General in 
Her territories is the titular Head of State, the Prime Minister being its true Head. 
The Prime Minister is central to the entire parliament. He names the Ministers 
who are appointed by the Governor-General and assigns their portfolios, and 
they all sit at his pleasure, with the power to dismiss them at any time, without 
reason.86 In this system, the Prime Minister can be said to be all-powerful, with 
the means to be tyrannical if he so chose.  
 
                                                        
85 R. Khurshid, “Is Parliamentary form of Government good enough for India?: Need for a Change” 
[Online] (URL: http://www.lawctopus.com/academike/is-parliamentary-form-of-government-
good-enough-for-india-need-for-a-change/)  
86 Supra fn. 2, S.60(3) 
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In defence to that power, the parliament can move a motion of no confidence in 
the Prime Minister, which, if successful, would mean he would be forced to step 
down or advise the Governor-General to dissolve parliament.87  
 
This may be considered by some to create a state of instability, that is, with the 
power to advise a dissolution the Prime Minister can wield this as a sword of 
Damocles over the heads of his majority rule in the House and over the 
Opposition, particularly, if neither the government nor the Opposition is ready to 
face an election; and as there is no limit nor criteria to move such a motion it can 
be done as often as members choose.  
 
A prescient constitution has provided for this eventuality in the titular Head of 
State, authorising Her, in Her own judgment, to refuse to dissolve parliament if 
she feels that there is another in the House capable of commanding the majority. 
In that way, a government is safe-guarded on both points; it can go to an election 
after a no confidence vote to gain a fresh mandate or the Prime Minister can be 
substituted for another, and the business of government continue, 
uninterrupted.88  
 
Under a presidential system the people must stay with their choice for the entire 
term of office no matter how unpopular their president is, unless he is 
impeached by the congress. So inflexible is the US presidential system in this 
regard that President Johnson was criminally impeached in an effort to oust him 
from office as the congress saw this as the only available option to have him 
                                                        
87 Ibid, S. 60(6)  
88 (1) Following the death of Sir John Compton on September 8 2007 a new Prime Minister was 
selected in Saint Lucia in the person of Stephenson King which allowed stable government to 
continue without election: M.l Martin, “Saint Lucia Remembers Sir John” [Online] (URL: 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=14380957)  (2) Between 1979 and 
1982 following political upheaval after independence the Prime Minister-ship of Saint Lucia 
changed hands 3 times in less than 5 years: Allan Lewis to Winston Cenac and finally Michael 
Pilgrim - all without election; “Prime Ministers of Saint Lucia” [Online] (URL: 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Prime_Ministers_of_Saint_Lucia#Prime_Ministers_of_Saint
_Lucia_.281979.E2.80.93present.29)  (3) Following Brexit and the resignation of David Cameron 
a new Prime Minister was selected in the person of Theresa May, again allowing stable 
government to continue without election -  A.  Dewan and L. Isaac, “David Cameron to Resign 
Wednesday as Theresa May to Become British PM” [Online] (URL: 
http://edition.cnn.com/2016/07/11/europe/britain-politics-may-leadsom/)  
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removed.89  For much of the 20th century presidential governments have 
developed a bad reputation due to the failure of their system, largely due, it 
would seem, to issues with governance.90 On account of what is said to be 
inflexibility within this system coups have resulted in an effort to remove 
feckless Presidents.91 
 
Within a parliamentary system there is an interconnectedness between the 
executive and the legislature and therefore it cannot be said that they are wholly 
independent of each other. The Prime Minister chooses the Executive from the 
parliament and they remain accountable to the preponderant Assembly for their 
actions through a time-honoured process of question time, which entitles the 
House to enquire of and ask detailed information regarding the work of these 
Ministers. If they fail to perform, the whole executive can be held accountable 
and the Prime Minister with them and a vote of no confidence can be moved, the 
House dissolved and the entire government removed, or, the Prime Minister may 
choose to dismiss that individual or individuals if the sacrifice on the political 
altar is more palatable, or, that Minister may do the honourable thing and resign 
his seat altogether. Because the integrity of each member within the cabinet is 
tied to the other, there is an obligation and incentive to check each other, hence 
the doctrine of collective responsibility in which Ministers must “sink or swim 
together.”92 The latter option is rarely, if ever used in Saint Lucia, as politicians 
generally choose to fight rather than flee.93   
 
                                                        
89 Supra fn. 52, p.18 and 19: Following the assassination of Lincoln Johnston the then Vice 
President became the President. According to Bagehot’s account, the congress was gravely 
hostile towards him because his plan to pacify the south was contrary to theirs and the congress 
then employed the only means at their disposal-impeachment. They were never able to succeed. 
90 Supra fn. 8, p. 4 
91 2000 and 2005-Ecuadorian coup by indigenous people to protest the economic policies of the 
president; 2002-Venuezuela coup under which the president was detained; 2004- Haitian coup 
to oust president Aristide in his 2nd term of office; 2004, 2006 & 20013- coup in Chad to oust 
President Deby; 2005 & 2008-coup in Mauritania to overthrow president; 2006- coups in 
Philippines and Madagascar to overthrow president and 2010- coup in Egypt to oust president 
and his government. [Online] (URL: 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_coups_d%27état_and_coup_attempts 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_coups_d%27état_and_coup_attempts_since_2010)  
92 Supra fn. 86, p. 3.  
93 Supra fn. 82  
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While a certain incestuous element may appear to be evident in the relationship, 
it makes for easier passage of laws and steadier growth for the country because 
the Prime Minister is assured of the support, of not just his cabinet, but also the 
majority of the legislature. It may seem contrary to the principle of scrutiny 
when one’s decision hangs, not only on the matter of good governance and 
whether a bill before it meets the standard, but may depend more on the 
question of dismissal from the cabinet, the party and re-election if one was to go 
against the grain94 but it does afford a degree of unity and stability necessary for 
good and steady governance and economic growth.95  
 
One method by which every Prime Minister is checked within the parliamentary 
system, aside from votes of no confidence, is the right of every member of the 
House to change his allegiance. A Prime Minister is therefore always cognizant of 
the fact, that should he consistently choose to ignore the advice and guidance of 
his Ministers or his members in the House they can retaliate by switching their 
allegiance. This can go towards either weakening his government by reducing his 
majority or else creating a situation wherein the composition of the House 
changes and the Opposition party could become the ruling party.96  
 
Some might argue that changing allegiance is a dangerous precedent and an act 
of betrayal, because the people voted, not just for the man, but the party. But 
arguably, the important constitutional protection of freedom of association 
ought not to be whittled away on a whim and a fancy, with little understanding of 
                                                        
94 In 2004 the then Minister for Gender Relations Sarah Flood-Beaubrun vehemently opposed the 
passage of what was known as the Abortion Bill. From the floor of the House she castigated her 
fellow cabinet and legislative colleagues yet refused to resign from the cabinet. She was 
reshuffled out of the Cabinet months later. She subsequently resigned from the party and never 
ran an election for the Saint Lucia Labour Party again: Caribbean Net News “St. Lucian Cabinet 
Minister fired from her post” [Online] (URL: 
http://www.caribbeannewsnow.com/caribnet/2004/01/13/minister.htm)  
95 Supra fn. 41; Sir John’s almost uninterrupted leadership in Saint Lucia saw significant 
development in the country over an almost 30 year span.  
96 Supra, fn. 2, Section 11(1) provides that a person cannot, without his consent, be hindered in 
his enjoyment of his freedom of assembly and association and in particular to form or belong to 
political parties or other political associations. Opposition Leader in the House, Neville Cenac, 
“crossed the floor” in 1987 from the St. Lucia Labour Party to the United Workers Party following 
two general elections in the same month in which the ruling party in the House won by a 
majority of only one seat which meant the majority party was significantly weakened in the 
House. This change gave the ruling party a more comfortable majority of two seats. N. Cenac, “He 
Who is Double-Crossed Crosses” [Online] (URL: https://stluciastar.com/32490/). 
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the safeguards against oppression and tyranny therein contained. And while 
every check is not promised to be full-proof and without its risk, it is far better to 
have more checks to protect the people than less, for in the end, it is not the 
checks by themselves that will make the system work but the vigilant eye that is 
kept by the men who have been elected and nominated to watch over it. In such 
instances the education of the electorate is key to understanding the laws and 
why they are present so as to avoid misguided reforms.97   
 
The legislature on the other hand is checked by the Senate which scrutinises all  
bills, except money bills98 initiated through the House of Assembly and which 
bills the Senate can amend or refuse to approve.  
 
Under a presidential system there is said to be real, genuine scrutiny as no 
member of the Congress or Senate are beholden to the President and each is 
allowed to vote his individual choice or conscience.99 While the President may 
retain his right of veto he is always conscious of the fact that he needs Congress 
and this right must be exercised judiciously and not arbitrarily to frustrate 
Congress. Congress may override this veto with a two-thirds majority.100  
 
This system unfortunately does not guarantee the President a majority to allow 
him easy access to pass laws. On the contrary, there is more opportunity for 
stalemate and gridlock,101 particularly when the President and the Congress are 
formed from different parties.102 For example, during President Obama’s term of 
office as a Democratic President, a majority Republican Congress made it much 
more difficult for him to pass the laws he wanted, like Obamacare.103 As Bagehot 
                                                        
97 Supra fn. 10 p. 3 & 4 
98 Supra fn. 2, S. 50(2) and S. 48 and 49  
99 T. O. Sargentich, “The Presidential and Parliamentary Models of National Government” American 
University International Law Review, 8(2), p. 581. [Online] (URL: 
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1870&context=auilr) 
100 “Presidential Vetoes” [Online] (URL: http://history.house.gov/Institution/Presidential-
Vetoes/Presidential-Vetoes/)  
101 Supra fn. 8, p. 3 
102 M. Kranish, “UK’s Parliamentary System offers clues for escaping gridlock” and Ibid, p. 2 
103 W. Ray and T. Norbeck, “Forbes commentary on a look back on the passage of Obamacare” 
[Online] (URL: http://www.forbes.com/sites/physiciansfoundation/2014/03/26/a-look-back-
at-how-the-president-was-able-to-sign-obamacare-into-law-four-years-ago/#1edf1d2d4096)   
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states, the President “is elected in one way, at one time, and congress (no matter 
which House) is elected in another way, at another time. The two have nothing to 
bind them together and in fact continually disagree.” 104  
 
Both the parliamentary and presidential systems have a two-chamber scrutiny 
process; the British model, a House of Commons and House of Lords; and the 
Washington model, the Congress and the Senate. This two-tiered system ensures 
that each chamber maintains a watchful eye over the other so that proposed bills 
do not become law without the proper inspection, inquiry and close examination. 
There is no greater check on the preponderant legislative assembly than that 
imposed by the second chamber, the Senate. In a similar regard the all-powerful 
Assembly can seek to curb the power of the cabinet by denial of funds to carry 
out its projects, or by the control of expenditure out of the consolidated fund.105   
 
In the parliamentary system in Saint Lucia this has been found to be almost 
farcical since the government enjoys the majority vote in both the House and the 
Senate and would undoubtedly always receive the votes it required to authorise 
its expenditure, its members being more interested in toeing the party line than 
acting in the best interest of the people and the country.106 In discussing the role 
of the Prime Minister over that of an elected President Arthur Schlesinger had 
this to say: 
“Parliament’s superiority over congress in delivering whatever the executive 
requests is a function of weakness, not of strength…… the Prime Minister appoints 
people to office without worrying about parliamentary confirmation, concludes 
treaties without worrying about parliamentary authorisation, withholds 
information without worrying about parliamentary subpoenas, is relatively safe 
from parliamentary investigation and in many respects has inherited the authority 
that once belonged to absolute monarchy……. a Prime Minister with a majority of 
parliament behind him has much more authority than an American President.”107 
                                                        
104 Supra fn. 52, p. 18 
105 Supra fn. 2, S. 79(2). Under the US constitution, Article 1, Section 7, Clause 1 states that “All 
bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives…..”  [Online] (URL: 
http://history.house.gov/Institution/Origins-Development/Power-of-the-Purse/)  
106 Supra fn. 41 
107 Supra, fn. 99, p. 581  
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Notwithstanding, its usefulness is in its agility to realise quick decisions and 
quick action108 unlike a presidential system, designed more to guard the 
freedoms of the people than to produce efficiency.109  
 
Within the Washington model are all the ingredients to create gridlock110 and 
prevent a President from efficiently and effectively carrying out his mandate, 
particularly where the President and either or both of the chambers do not sit 
under the same party banner.  
 
The flexibility inherent in the British system allows for votes of no confidence in 
the Prime Minister, dismissal of cabinet Ministers with a reshuffle and 
replacement of a Prime Minister, all within a 5-year term, which would not 
automatically lead to a recall to the polls. Such a safety valve assures stability.  
 
The intransigence of the Washington model means that unpopular Presidents 
must be suffered till the end of their term of office111 and appointment and 
removal and re-appointment of members of the Cabinet and other prominent 
                                                        
108 For the first time in the history of the Saint Lucian Parliament the Opposition have found an 
ingenious tool to gridlock the Parliament by using the delayed appointment of a Deputy Speaker  
to state that the parliament cannot, under S. 35 conduct any business until this is done. As many 
of the elected members of the majority party now form the cabinet it would mean that the 
Deputy Speaker would have to be appointed from the Opposition side who are refusing to accept 
any such appointment. Saint Lucia Times “Opposition Leader clears the air on Deputy Speaker 
issue” [Online] (URL: http://stluciatimes.com/2016/07/16/opposition-leader-clears-air-deputy-
speaker-issue) and N. Cenac “The Recurrent Stupidity Surrounding the Office of Deputy Speaker” 
[Online] (URL: http://www.pressreader.com/saint-lucia/the-star-st-
lucia/20160730/281801398331796)  
109 J. Madison, “Federalist Paper No. 51,” [Online]URL: 
https://www.congress.gov/resources/display/content/The+Federalist+Papers#TheFederalistP
apers-51  
110 The different ways in which the American system causes gridlock are as follows: (1) By 
filibustering to frustrate the House to either pass or pass over a law, (2) individual voting with no 
responsibility to the collective (collective responsibility), (3) President and chambers from 
different parties and therefore can make it more difficult for passage of laws. 
111 J. M. Carey, “Presidential versus Parliamentary Government” p. 94, [Online] (URL: 
http://www.colorado.edu/ibs/es/alston/psci4028/fall_2010/Presidential%20versus%20Parlia
mentary%20Government%20by%20Carey.pdf)   
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positions must be approved by the Senate.112 This could mean delaying the 
business of government while the Senate undergoes its approval process.113  
 
On the other hand, this process of senatorial approval is a good way to ensure 
that the best man is appointed to the job, unlike under a parliamentary model, 
where it is not usually about the best man getting the job, but the man who is 
more than likely willing to support the position of the Prime Minister, come what 
may.114 The era of Thatcherism saw the “iron lady” restocking her entire cabinet 
with supporters to her cause.115   
 
Notwithstanding, the fact that Presidents are allowed to live out their full term, 
without contest, save for impeachment for serious breach of office makes for a 
fairly stable government capable of making long term policy plans and seeing 
them through.116 But, for this stability, the risk must be, that President’s, with the 
whole of executive power concentrated in their hands, even with a cabinet, 
whose advice the President is under no obligation to take, coupled with his 
power of veto, can become almost dictatorial in his management of the affairs of 
the country.117 The opportunity for abuse and misuse of power is far greater in a 
presidential system, with the executive being almost unaccountable to the 
legislature and in turn the people. If the legislature feels stymied in taking the 
long and difficult route to impeachment their only safeguard is to stalemate the 
President through a lack of cooperation, by drawing out and making processes 
more lengthy and more difficult than they need to be,118 and resorting, finally, to 
unconstitutional means to remove the president which tends to threaten the 
stability and democracy of the country.119  
                                                        
112 “Presidentially Appointed Jobs Require Senate Approval” [Online] (URL: 
http://usgovinfo.about.com/od/thepresidentandcabinet/a/sentateconfirm.htm)  
113 Ibid 
114 Supra fn. 41 
115 The Economist, “Margaret Thatcher: A cut above the rest” [Online] (URL: 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/blighty/2013/04/margaret-thatcher-0)  
116 Supra, fn. 111 
117 When George W. Bush became president in 2001 there was a move to appoint judges to the 
Supreme Court with a more conservative leaning. It raised issues of separation of powers and 
these were challenged at congressional hearings and the nominees put down. 
118 One example to stymie the process is through filibustering in the Senate to stall or prevent the 
passage of a law. 
119 Supra fn. 107 
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A British model is largely premised on a two-party system, which gives a clear 
majority in the House and makes it easier for the government to implement its 
policies. Its danger lies in its checks and balances either being ignored or little 
used. In other words, the stronger the government’s majority in the House, the 
weaker the checks.  A multi-party system, while not foreign to this political 
culture is not ideal, for its leads to a need to form coalition governments, which 
can prove chaotic and unstable. The coalition is built on the common goal to form 
a government and not on common ideals. This unfailingly leads to a plethora of 
differing positions and the likelihood of numerous votes of no confidence in the 
government from within the very coalition.120   
 
It has been further argued, that unlike the Washington system which sees 
individuals well-seasoned in political life, either through personal experience or 
vicariously through family heritage, either politically or in their respective area 
of expertise, the parliamentary system sees more men and women elected based 
on a social scale, that is, their popularity in the field.121 This inevitably means 
persons being selected without the requisite qualifications to operate in a highly 
competitive and technical system, leaving the real running of the country to 
bureaucrats who have been known to pray on the ignorance of these elected 
members and misuse the resources at their disposal.122    
   
There is much to be said both for and against each system but there seems to be 
a tendency to idealise the presidential system because of the United States, one 
                                                        
120  The Republic of Vanuatu, with a constitutional President under a modified Westminster 
model is a prime example where coalition governments are frequently formed leading to 
numerous no confidence votes. It has become almost part of the parliamentary culture to move 
such votes and is encouraged by those ambitious members seeking Prime Ministerial office. In 
the stated case members had been paid for their vote of no confidence:  J. Tahana, “Vanuatu 
Shaken by Mass Corruption Convictions” [Online] (URL: 
http://www.radionz.co.nz/international/pacific-news/286695/vanuatu-shaken-by-mass-
corruption-convictions) and “Vanuatu Sentences 14 MP’s to jail for corruption” [Online] (URL: 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-34600561)   
121 Supra fn. 41 
122 Supra, fn. 111 
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of the few Republics that has successfully maintained this model without 
economic destabilization and political chaos.123  
 
Scrutiny of Legislation as a Bar to parliamentary abuse 
Pre-legislative scrutiny is “generally acknowledged to be one of the most 
successful innovations in the legislative process in recent years.”124 And at a 
reading of a Bill, one of the Chairmen of the Joint Committee said of the process: 
    “I remain a real convert to the pre-legislative process… That process is far less 
partisan and far more open to analysis and debate, and, as a consequence, makes, 
where it is possible, for far better law….”125 
 
It is clear from the above, that the supporters of legislative scrutiny, one of the 
major functions of any parliament, believe that without any proper scrutiny bad 
laws will result, which in and of itself can open doors to potential abuse. When 
the option for committees to more closely scrutinise laws is not utilised, when 
opposition members are given late notice of bills to be debated so that 
insufficient consultation and research can be undertaken, when parliamentary 
time is limited so that bills cannot be fully debated and when the public are 
either not consulted or consulted little, it allows a government to initiate and 
pass laws that may prove adverse to the nation.126 These oft used tactics by a 
ruling party in the parliament undermines the parliamentary system and only 
cause the electorate to lose faith in that system and its process and causes them 
to call for drastic changes that may not necessarily be needed in an effort to seal 
the gap that appears evident.   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
123 Supra fn. 8, p. 4 
124 Select Committee on Modernisation of the House of Commons, 1st Report of Session (2005-
2006), The Legislative Process, HC1097 para. 12, [Online] (URL: 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200506/cmselect/cmmodern/1097/1097.pdf) 
125 Ibid  
126 Supra fn. 77 and Supra fn. 40 
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Westminster/Republic Model in the Caribbean 
Before Saint Lucia leaps into the unknown it would be useful to examine similar 
jurisdictions within the Caribbean that shared a not dissimilar past, who have 
gone the way of a partial or full republic and what their results have been to 
ascertain whether we can learn from them the best way forward. The author will 
examine the Republics of Dominica, Trinidad & Tobago and Guyana. 
 
DOMINICA 
When independence was obtained on 3rd November 1978 Dominica became the 
Commonwealth Republic of Dominica.127 Their Republic was a fusion of the 
Parliamentary with the Presidential model of government.  
 
The history of Dominica is revealing in itself as to why the country, once ruled by 
Britain, would not have immediately rolled out the Westminster system. 
Dominica has been one of the only Caribbean countries which conferred political 
and social rights on free coloured blacks as early as 1831, prior to the abolition 
of slavery which resulted in the first three black men being elected to the 
Legislative Assembly in 1835, only one year after slavery was abolished. By 1838 
the elected Assembly was mostly controlled by blacks. Although their power was 
systematically eroded over time and their rights curtailed, Dominica was 
eventually able to take control of its internal affairs even while still an Associate 
State of Britain, till it gained its independence and opted to become a Republic 
State.128  
 
Unlike other Caribbean countries controlled by Britain, it is clear from early on 
that black Dominicans worked hard to acquire control over their affairs. Having 
achieved some level of freedom since 1831 the black Dominicans had the faith 
that they were more than comfortable taking their new steps into independence 
without being maternally attached to Britain. The best route they felt was to cut 
all colonial ties to the United Kingdom and assert their sovereignty by naming a 
ceremonial President as their Head of State rather than the Queen.  
                                                        
127 “Dominica History” [Online] (URL: http://thecommonwealth.org/our-member-
countries/dominica/history) 
128 “Dominica” [Online] (URL: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dominica)  
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The institution of the Presidency is the most significant common element 
between Dominica and a Republic State like the United States. Save for that, 
every other element resembles a parliamentary system.  
 
Under the Dominica Constitution, which is an almost exact replica of that of Saint 
Lucia, save for the aforementioned difference, the President is elected by the 
House of Assembly to serve a five-year term.129 The House itself is made up of 
elected representatives to correspond to the number of their constituency seats 
and nine Senators who may be either nominated or elected.130 
 
With the exception of a very brief tumultuous event from May 1979 to 21st June 
in which, what was referred to as a “civilian coup”131 took place, Dominica has 
experienced a relatively peaceful existence, unmarked by any serious upheaval.   
 
 
TRINIDAD & TOBAGO 
Before 1961, the parliament of Trinidad & Tobago was unicameral. A decision to 
return to the Westminster bicameral system may be explained  by the inimitable 
Dr. Eric Williams when he spoke on Constitutional Reform in the country. He 
stated that unicameralism was colonial in form and operation and that to keep it 
would be to continue to extend colonialism, but that democracy dictated the 
abolition of the single chamber for the two.132 He has been recorded as having 
said, that if Westminster is good enough for the British people it is good enough 
for them.133 Some saw this as a backward move to return the parliament to its 
subordinate role to the Executive, thereby extinguishing the independence of the 
                                                        
129 Section 18(1) of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Dominica:[Online] (URL: 
http://www.parliament.am/library/sahmanadrutyunner/dominika.pdf ) 
130 Ibid, S. 30 and 34. Though the Senators can be appointed (5 by the President on the advice of 
the Prime Minister and 4 by the President on the advice of the Leader of the Opposition), the 
House can opt to have the Senators put to election by the Parliament.   
131  “A Study in Peaceful Extra-Constitutional Change on the Caribbean Island of Dominica” 
[Online] (URL: http://presidentoffice.gov.dm/former-presidents/25-his-excellency-dr-nicholas-
j-o-liverpool-2003-2012/24-a-study-in-peaceful-extra-constitutional-change-on-the-caribbean-
island-of-dominica)  
132 Supra, fn. 63, p. 39 
133 Supra fn. 7, p.97 and Ibid, p. 87 
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legislature, accountability to the people and essentially democracy.134 Writers 
like Dr. Meighoo are of the view that the fundamental question to be addressed 
has and is the “unequal power of the representatives and the power of the 
Executive, particularly with regard to the expenditures of public funds, but also 
with the making of laws and policy.”135    
 
The Republic of Trinidad sees its President appointed by the Electoral College 
made up of the House of Representatives and the Senate136 who is removable 
only upon a two-thirds vote of the members of both Houses.137 The President 
retains the prerogative powers of the Queen to advise and warn and to be 
informed138 and acts always on the advice of, except where he is designated to 
act in his own deliberate judgment.139  
 
The President selects the Prime Minister and the Opposition Leader as well as 
the Senate and Ministers of government in the same manner as in the 
Westminster model,140 and the Prime Minister can be removed with a no 
confidence vote.141 
 
The Ombudsman142 and members of the Public Service Commission143 are 
appointed for a term of 5 years and removable only for the reasons specified in 
the constitution. 
 
The constitution makes provision for the selection of joint committees to, among 
other things, oversee the works of government ministries. They must be 
appointed no later than 3 months following a general election,144 must sit in 
                                                        
134 Supra fn. 63, p. 35 
135 Ibid 
136 Constitution of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, Cap. 1.01, S.29 and 28 [Online] (URL: 
www.oas.org/juridico/english/mesicic3_tto_constitution.pdf) 
137 Ibid, S.36  
138 Ibid, S.81 
139 Ibid, S.80 
140 Ibid, S.76(1), S40, S76(3) and 79 respectively  
141 Ibid, S.77 
142 Ibid, S.91(3) 
143 Ibid, S.126(3)(a) 
144 Ibid, S.66A(A) 
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public145 and their reports must be laid before the House.146  All Service 
Commissions, including the Judicial and Legal Services Commission (JLSC) and 
government ministries must submit annual reports to the President.147 
 
In this system it is important to note that the members of the Police Commission 
are appointed by the President in consultation with the Prime Minister and 
Leader of the Opposition148 which appointment cannot be made until the 
affirmative resolution of the House.149  
 
GUYANA 
Guyana’s independence in 1966 was not immediately marked by a move from a 
constitutional monarchy to the Republic they have today. This change did not 
come till the 23rd February 1970. Prior to that Guyana had enjoyed, as early as 
1831 till 1928, some form of British run government under the control of a Court 
of Policy (a Dutch concept) made up of a Governor and seven officials and eight 
elected members with the Governor presiding over the Court of Policy.150  
 
In 1928 when a new constitution was passed, Guyana officially became a British 
Crown Colony and a Legislative Assembly was set up151 This new parliament was 
suspended and was not reconstituted till the 1961 constitution, which re-
established the bicameral legislature made up of a Legislative Assembly and a 
Senate, the latter consisting of 13 members appointed by the Governor of which 
8 were appointed in accordance with the advice of the Prime Minister, 3 
appointed by the Governor to represent the minority view in consultation with 
such persons as he saw fit and 2 by the Governor acting under his own counsel. 
The Assembly consisted of 35 members with a council of Ministers selected from 
the Legislature comprising the Premier and 9 other Ministers who had general 
                                                        
145 Ibid, S.66(d) 
146 Ibid, S.66(e) 
147 Ibid, S.66(B & C) and S.66(D) respectively  
148 Ibid, S.122(c ) 
149 Ibid, S.122(4) 
150 Between 1831-1928 Guiana consisted of 3 colonies: Demerara, Essequibo and Berbice 
collectively known as the colony of British Guiana. “History of Parliament (Guyana),”[Online] 
(URL: http://parliament.gov.gy/about-parliament/about-parliamant-history/)  
151 Ibid 
 40 
direction and control of the country and were collectively responsible to the 
Legislature. 152 
 
The country later changed to a unicameral parliament, a move that was 
influenced by Britain which had always maintained a single chamber in an effort 
to better concentrate and centralize power.153  
 
The Guyanese system is a hybrid of the Westminster and Republican system in 
that its parliament operates within a Westminster model, with the same rules 
and procedure with even the system of finance following that of the United 
Kingdom.154  
 
Since becoming a Republic the Guyanese constitution has a President elected by 
the people155 and as the head of the Executive he is the “supreme executive 
authority and commander-in-chief of the armed forces”. 156  Full Executive 
authority is vested in him157 and the Cabinet is made up of the President, the 
Prime Minister and such other Ministers as the President may designate.158 
Under the constitution, wherever the President must act it is always in his own 
deliberate judgment save where the constitution specifies otherwise.159 
 
The President of this Republic clearly enjoys a wide range of powers beyond the 
ceremonial:  
 He can only be removed for a violation of the constitution or gross 
misconduct.160 
 He alone can prorogue and dissolve parliament.161 
                                                        
152 Ibid 
153 Unpublished interview: Manzo Nadir (Former Leader of the United Force in Guyana from 
about 1980 to 2011, a former Member of Parliament from 1991 to 2015 and Cabinet Minister for 
Tourism, Industry and Trade and then Minister for Labour), Interview with author. Skype. 
Vanuatu-Guyana, 18th August 2016 at 11am.  
154 Ibid 
155 Constitution of the Co-Operative Republic of Guyana Act, Cap. 1.01, S. 91 [Online] (URL: 
http://parliament.gov.gy/constitution.pdf)  
156 Ibid, S. 89  
157 Ibid, S. 99 
158 Ibid, S. 106 
159 Ibid, S. 111 
160 Ibid, S. 94 
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 He selects the Prime Minister and Ministers.162 
 Assigns ministerial portfolios.163 
 Presides over cabinet meetings.164 
 Can invite any other person to sit in on any cabinet meeting.165 
 Allowed to act in most matters taking into account is own judgment.166 
The constitution establishes a number of committees (Standing and Sectoral 
committees and sub-committees of cabinet) dedicated to the work of parliament 
and cabinet.167 They are said to work quite effectively in informing the work of 
the parliament and the cabinet.168 
 
According to Mr. Nadir, the hybrid Republican system has been working well for 
Guyana “as there has been no public outcry for change.” Nonetheless, he pointed 
out that while the people take no issue with the powers of the President and his 
decisiveness in wielding that power, the people still feel that there is a need to 
have more checks and balances within the system.169  
 
The checks and balances currently operating within the system are:170 
 
 The use of the committees of parliament and cabinet. While reports of the 
committees are not bound to be accepted, they can carry considerable 
sway particularly when published, and receive the backing of the public. 
In that regard parliament is then motivated to address any concerns 
raised in the committee reports.  
 No bill can be passed to the President for approval unless it has first gone 
through the parliament and undergone all the necessary scrutiny of 
investigations, consultations and debate. 
                                                                                                                                                              
161 Ibid, S. 70. Section. 180 sets out the procedure for removal which could be likened to the 
impeachment process in the United States.  
162 Ibid, S. 101(1)  
163 Ibid, S. 107 
164 Ibid, S. 100 and 106(3) 
165 Ibid, S. 106(5)  
166 Ibid, S. 111(2) 
167 Ibid, Sections 118 and 119 
168 Supra, fn. 153 
169 Ibid 
170 Ibid 
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 Judicial Review is available against actions of the government deemed 
unlawful. 
 There is an ombudsman but he is considered a “toothless poodle”171 but 
since any reports emanating from his office can be published it gives his 
recommendations some persuasive authority with parliament as it can 
cause a public outcry if recommendations of national import are ignored.  
 Key positions like the chancellor and police commissioner must receive 
the agreement of the Leader of the Opposition before the President can 
make a selection.  
 
Figure 1: Similarities and Differences between Saint Lucia and the contrasting jurisdictions 
GUYANA  DOMINICA TRINIDAD & 
TOBAGO 
SAINT LUCIA COMMENTS  
President 
elected at large 
for 5 years and 
can be removed  
for incapacity or 
gross 
misconduct or 
by a successful 
vote of no 
confidence 
against the 
government  
President 
elected by both 
Houses for 5 
years but can be 
removed for 
gross 
misconduct 
President elected 
by Electoral 
College for 5 
years and can be 
removed on a 
2/3’s vote of 
both Houses  
Governor-General 
appointed by the 
Queen on 
recommendation of 
Prime Minister 
In Saint Lucia 
no mention of 
the actual 
procedure 
regarding the 
Governor 
General’s 
appointment 
and how she 
may be 
removed 
Unicameral 
Parliament  
Bicameral 
Parliament 
Bicameral 
Parliament  
Bicameral 
Parliament 
 
No Senate. All 
members of the 
Assembly are 
elected 
Senators 
appointed at 
pleasure of the 
Prime Minister 
and Leader of 
the Opposition. 
President does 
Senators 
appointed at 
pleasure of the 
Prime Minister, 
Leader of the 
Opposition and 
President 
Senators appointed 
at pleasure of the 
Prime Minister, 
Leader of the 
Opposition and 
Governor General 
 
                                                        
171 Ibid 
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not have the 
power to make 
any senatorial 
appointments 
in his own 
discretion 
N/A No provision 
for president to 
appoint any 
senators in his 
own judgment. 
Majority party 
in the House 
has only a one 
person majority 
in the Senate 
over the 
Opposition  
President gets a 
3 person 
majority in the 
Senate over the 
Opposition. The 
Opposition has 
no majority. 
Leader of the 
Opposition has 
only a one person 
majority in the 
Senate over the 
Governor General 
appointees but no 
majority over the 
ruling party’s 
appointees. 
 
No mandatory 
provision for 
committees to 
be in place by a 
designated time 
but may co-opt 
experts to assist 
in their work 
No requirement 
for the 
establishment 
of any 
Committees but 
according to Dr. 
Basdeo they are 
utilised 
Committees 
must be in place 
3 months after 
elections and can 
delegate to sub 
committees and 
select specialist 
advisers 
No mandatory 
provision for 
committees to be in 
place by a 
designated time 
except to say that 
they will be 
appointed by the 
House as soon as 
may be after the 
beginning of 
parliament. 
NB: this provision 
is not in the 
constitution but 
only the Standing 
Orders of the 
House 
 
Proportional 
Representation  
First past the 
Post 
First past the 
Post 
First past the Post  
Executive Executive Executive Executive authority  
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authority vests 
in the president 
and cabinet and 
the cabinet is 
collectively 
responsible 
authority vests 
in the president 
and the cabinet 
and the Cabinet 
collectively 
responsible 
authority vests in 
the President 
and Cabinet and 
the Cabinet 
collectively 
responsible 
vests in the Cabinet 
and the cabinet is 
collectively 
responsible 
President has 
numerous 
powers which he 
is free to invoke 
without seeking 
or acting upon 
advice.  
President 
always acts on 
advise except in 
limited 
circumstances  
where he can 
act in his own 
deliberate 
judgment  
President always 
acts on advise 
except in limited 
circumstances  
where he can act 
in his own 
deliberate 
judgment  
Governor General 
always acts on 
advise except in 
limited 
circumstances  
where she can act 
in her own 
deliberate 
judgment  
 
Inference that 
president can 
remove Prime 
Minister 
Prime Minister 
can be removed 
on a no 
confidence vote 
by the House 
Prime Minister 
can be removed 
on a no 
confidence vote 
by the House  
Prime Minister can 
be removed on a no 
confidence vote by 
the House 
 
Ombudsman 
appointed for 4 
years. Does not 
speak to 
removal  
Ombudsman 
has tenure for 5 
years and only 
removable if 
incapable of 
performing 
functions 
Ombudsman has 
tenure for 5 
years but does 
not speak to 
removal 
Ombudsman has 
tenure for 5 years 
and only removable 
if incapable of 
performing 
functions 
 
President has a 
much larger role 
[SEE: p. 40-41 of 
thesis] 
President 
retains 
prerogative 
power to 
advise, warn 
and be 
informed 
President retains 
prerogative 
power to advise, 
warn and be 
informed  
Governor General 
retains prerogative 
power to advise, 
warn and be 
informed 
 
Chairman of 
Police 
Commission 
appointed by 
president after 
Police 
Commission 
chairman and 
deputy 
appointed by 
Police 
Commission 
must have 
approval of 
Prime Minister 
Public Service 
Commission must 
have approval of 
Prime Minister to 
appoint a Police 
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consultation 
with Leader of 
the Opposition 
and 4 additional 
members 
nominated by 
National 
Assembly 
president on 
advice of Prime 
Minister, 5 
other members 
on the advice of 
Prime Minister 
in consultation 
with the Leader 
of the 
Opposition 
and Leader of the 
Opposition and 
an affirmative 
resolution of the 
House of 
representatives 
to appoint Police 
Commissioner 
Commissioner 
Prime Minister 
appointed by 
president from 
within the 
National 
Assembly 
Prime Minister 
and Leader of 
the Opposition 
selected just as 
in Westminster  
Prime Minister 
and Leader of the 
Opposition 
selected just as 
in Westminster 
Prime Minister and 
Leader of the 
Opposition selected 
just as in 
Westminster 
 
No provision to 
set up Integrity 
Commission 
No provision to 
set up Integrity 
Commission 
Provision to set 
up a commission 
but no 
prescription for 
who will appoint 
its members but 
provides for 
parliament to be 
responsible for 
putting its 
procedures in 
place 
Members of the 
Commission 
appointed by 
Governor General 
on advice of Prime 
Minister. No 
provision to 
consult Leader of 
the Opposition 
before tendering 
advice. Each 
member is 
appointed for 3 
years and can only 
be removed for 
inability to perform 
functions 
 
 
Figure 1 reveals little by way of significant change or development occasioned 
by the move to a presidential/parliamentary model for the 3 jurisdictions of 
Dominica, Trinidad & Tobago and Guyana, save for their claim for independence 
from Britain by the appointment of their own presidential Head of State.  
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Nonetheless, what is entirely evident is the confidence they have continued to 
repose in the Westminster system, notwithstanding certain minor modifications. 
It is therefore apparent that a parliamentary/presidential design has worked 
since independence and continues to work for them. Saint Lucia should therefore 
have no reservations except for a similar outcome.     
 
Figure 2: Advantages and Disadvantages of the two models of Government 
ADVANTAGES OF 
PARLIAMENTARY 
SYSTEM 
 
DISADVANTAGES OF 
PARLIAMENTARY 
SYSTEM  
ADVANTAGES OF 
REPUBLIC SYSTEM  
DISADVANTAGES OF 
REPUBLIC SYSTEM 
Prime Minister and 
Cabinet can be 
removed by a vote of 
no confidence 
Concentration of 
power in hands of 
Prime Minister and 
cabinet with potential 
for abuse 
A more distinct 
separation of powers 
President almost 
unaccountable to the 
Legislature 
Easier passage of laws 
with executive control 
of legislature 
Executive controls 
legislature  
President serves full 
term and this can 
offer stability 
Cannot be removed 
even if unpopular 
except usually by a 
coup  
Prime Minister can be 
changed without an 
election 
No confidence votes 
can lead to instability 
Presidential 
appointments subject 
to approval by Senate 
Harder to pass laws 
as president has no 
guarantee of a 
majority in congress 
or senate  
Prime Minister and 
his cabinet can be 
questioned on their 
work with question 
time 
Prime Minister seen 
to have a hand in 
major appointments 
like Public Service 
Commission and 
Police Force with 
opportunity for 
nepotism and 
interference 
Better chance for 
scrutiny of legislation 
No collective 
responsibility among 
members. Individuals 
accountable only to 
themselves and this 
can lead to chaos and 
instability 
Collective 
responsibility means 
each Minister has the 
incentive to check the 
other 
Prime Minister’s 
appoint Ministers 
without opposition  
from either House of 
Assembly or senate  
 Power concentrated 
in hands of president 
with no obligation to 
listen to parliament 
and with his power to 
veto bills this can 
make him almost 
dictatorial 
Individual members 
can change allegiance 
to check Prime 
Minister 
Favoured position of 
Prime Minister and 
his cabinet can hinder 
adequate legislative 
scrutiny 
 More opportunity for 
gridlock through 
methods like 
filibustering 
Senate and 
committees act as a 
check on parliament  
No stated method to 
remove corrupt 
members  
 United States system 
set up to guard 
freedoms of the 
people rather than 
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produce efficiency 
A predominantly 2 
party system 
strengthens 
government so no 
need for coalition 
Opposition has very 
little power in the 
House and no 
majority in either 
House 
 More instances 
globally of instability 
with this type of 
regime 
Integrity Commission 
to stem corruption 
   
Ombudsman and 
Public Accounts 
Committee a powerful 
check on unlawful 
government acts and 
spending  
   
More instances 
globally of stability 
with this type of 
regime  
   
 
At figure 2, there seems to be as many advantages as there are disadvantages to 
the Westminster system, while the Republic/Presidential system shows more 
disadvantages than advantages. There also appear to be more checks existing 
within the parliamentary model than that of the Republic.  
 
It is apparent therefore that a move to a hybrid presidential/parliamentary 
model would be a better option for Saint Lucia than a constitutional design 
purely implementing one over the other.  
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CHAPTER 4 
The Report of the Constitutional Committee is most definite in its 
recommendations that the system, which currently prevails in Saint Lucia, is no 
longer working, is unsuited to polity and unwanted by the people.  
 
The proposals are for our constitutional Monarchy, under the British 
Westminster model to be supplanted, with either a full Republic model or a 
hybrid Republic Presidential/Parliamentary model which would take the best of 
both worlds and apply it to our jurisdiction. Whether this is a plausible remodel 
will be examined below.  
 
To discern the correctness of the proposition, a number of factors need to be 
examined:  
1. Can a distinct separation of powers be realistically achieved? 
2. Could the Washington model survive successfully in a Caribbean context? 
3. Are there greater benefits to be derived from a unicameral or bicameral 
parliament? 
4. What recommendations can realistically be made to bring about the 
constitutional change sought after?  
5. Will changing the model of parliament really change the system and the 
way in which the country runs and functions? 
6. Can a hybrid model of government be successfully implemented? 
The matters raised at nos.4, 5 and 6 will be addressed  at chapter 5.  
 
Can a distinct separation of powers be achieved? 
 The short answer would be no.  
 
It was not a distinction recognised or recommended by Montesquieu.172 It is a 
fallacy, an ideal that is unachievable. The three powers are separate branches of 
                                                        
172 Supra fn. 43 
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the same tree, they derive their power from the same source and it would be 
impossible to cut off one branch, either partially or entirely from that source and 
expect it to thrive without difficulty. Their distinction is not in their absolute 
separation but in the distinctness of their roles in relation to the whole.  
 
An examination of the Washington model reveals that it is fraught with conflict 
and gridlock, and while it may assure freedoms it does not assure efficiency and 
expediency.173 This is a product of their system, which is understood by the 
electorate, just as the British people understand their unwritten constitution. 
This is not a system that a fledgling democracy can tolerate. 
 
The Washington model stemmed out of the need of the people to ensure that 
never again would they be subjected to tyrannical government under a King174 
and that they would so separate the powers that neither branch could 
overshadow the other and abuse its power in order to strike its own path. The 
freedoms of the people, carved out of fire and brimstone were thereby 
guaranteed against potential tyranny,175 and they felt, that while the sacrifice of 
expediency was great, it was necessary and worth it.  
 
The Westminster system on the other hand evolved, not out of a burning desire 
to rest their freedom from a King but from the necessity to assist the King and, 
then later, to curtail his power. It was not something created in a flash, but over 
centuries of deliberate manoeuvrings till, what was deemed an ideal system for 
their people was born, a system that has stood strong for the British people for 
the last 800 years.  
 
 
 
 
                                                        
173 Supra, fn. 109 
174 “No Taxation without Representation” [Online] (URL: https://www.loc.gov/exhibits/magna-
carta-muse-and-mentor/no-taxation-without-representation.html) and J. Madison, “Federalist 
Paper No. 48 [Online](URL: http://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/document/federalist-
no-48/)  
175 Ibid 
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Could the Washington Model survive successfully in a Caribbean context? 
It has been said that one of the reasons why the British system works so well is 
because it is easy to understand.176 It is a system that indulges the imagination of 
the people. The people can understand the simple idea of a monarch and Her 
role, however oppressive or enlightened that monarch might be, but a Republic 
is an entity where the rule of law (the constitution) is the sword and shield on 
the battlefield, a more complex idea, “difficult to know and easy to mistake.”177 
The cultural backdrop to Westminster rises out of a legacy steeped in the legends 
of King Arthur and the Knights of the round-table, Lady Marion and Robin Hood, 
based on the honour of Knights and Kings. It is legacy told and retold till it 
formed the very marrow of the people and imbued them with this “mystic 
reverence [and] religious allegiance”178 which could not be manufactured.  
 
If this is an argument that can be canvassed it would be easy for the author to say 
therefore that a full Republic could not be successfully installed in Saint Lucia 
and neither can, it might appear, a pure Westminster system.  
 
Saint Lucia is a State where degradation has been forced into the marrow of its 
bones rather than honour, and this may, in some small or large part, account for 
the unease with which the Westminster system is lived out. Carl Stone has said of 
Jamaican politics, a statement true of Saint Lucia, that “Electors, especially those 
in constituencies consisting of the poor and socially excluded, exchange their votes 
for jobs and other benefits,” and that “the fiscal crisis of the State was drying up the 
flow of benefits to supporters of the Party in power.”179 Islands, like Saint Lucia, 
have never been taught the higher ideals of the Westminster system and so it is 
treated as a means to barter for self rather than for State. 
 
Saint Lucians do not so much want an entirely new system. Based on the Report 
and its findings it is clear that what they want is a system that allows them 
                                                        
176 Supra fn. 52, p. 34 
177 Ibid 
178 Ibid, p. 24   
179 Supra fn. 7, p. 100 
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greater participation and the means to address corruption and abuses within the 
government and the parliament.180 A Republic is too wide and complicated a 
concept for them, which would account for the revision of their recommendation 
to a less dramatic change to a hybrid presidential/parliamentary model181 where 
they have the trappings of a president, albeit ceremonial, but they retain all the 
best parts of the parliamentary system with a few additions.  
 
The data itself reveals that Republics around the world, with the exception of the 
United States are, more often than not, unstable, and the removal of the 
President often has to be done by an overturning of the government by a military 
coup.182 The Caribbean and Saint Lucia have neither the resources nor the 
economic means to risk such instability.  
 
The Westminster model throughout the world has been held out as a beacon of 
peace and stability, and countries coming out of a colonial past, with centuries to 
catch up with the rest of the world in terms of social, economic and political 
development cannot afford to select a system that would not guarantee them 
stability first. This is not to say that the British model is perfect. Even the British 
are seeking to address their own issues for reform.183 What is needed is a better 
appreciation of how the system is meant to work, how it can realistically work in 
Saint Lucia and what recommendations can be offered to improve and enhance 
its efficiency.      
 
 
 
 
                                                        
180 Supra fn. 41: “My experience of 37 years in politics has shown me that St. Lucians want to feel 
and to touch their representatives and that those members of the House who reigned supreme in 
their constituencies were the ones who were constantly with the people on the ground, who sat 
in their homes and ate at their tables. The one term wonders were the ones who kept their 
distance.”  
181 Supra fn. 1, p. 27 
182 Supra fn. 8 and Supra fn. 91 
183 J. Parker, “Progress Report: Constitutional Reform” [Online] (URL: 
http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-16748163) and A. Defty, “Submission to select committee 
on inquiry on a new Magna Carta” [Online] (URL: 
https://whorunsbritain.blogs.lincoln.ac.uk/2015/04/20/submission-to-select-committee-
inquiry-on-a-new-magna-carta/)   
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Are there greater benefits to be derived from a unicameral of bicameral 
parliament? 
 
Checks and Balances in a Unicameral Parliament 
 
The Saint Lucia constitutional Report discussed the issue of unicameralism over 
what currently subsists in Saint Lucia, bicameralism. 184  After review, it 
determined that unicameralism would offer no greater scrutiny or accountability 
within the Parliament and were of the considered opinion that it was not so 
much the existence of the two chambers that made the House of Assembly 
inefficient but rather the “manner in which the senate was appointed”185 and that 
this could easily be cured by appointment of a larger number of senators who 
represented various interest groups such as the trade unions, business 
community, professionals, churches, sporting bodies and environmental 
interests186 rather than partisan appointments. Their recommendation was not 
to affect the balance of power in favour of the majority party in the House of 
Assembly but simply to realise the original intent of the Senate to provide a 
“sober, second thought”187 to the work of the Assembly.  
 
But the question whether a unicameral or a bicameral parliament would be an 
effective constitutional construct for Saint Lucia can only be examined by a look 
at parliaments which have a single chamber.  
 
It has been established that the purpose of a second chamber is to operate as a 
check on the work of the Assembly and provide effective guidance on the bills 
that come under their scrutiny in an effort to maintain and sustain good 
governance.   
 
                                                        
184 Supra fn. 1, p. 134-135 
185 Ibid 
186 Ibid 
187 Ibid 
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The Constitution Unit in London 188  examined 6 jurisdictions 189  that had 
implemented a unicameral parliament as part of their constitutional design. The 
purpose of the Report came out of the belief that a unicameral parliament was 
essentially flawed.190 In brief, the Unit concluded that it was, in the end, not so 
much whether the right design had been chosen but how well that design was 
structured to ensure “a constant, credible and legitimate check on government,” 
191in order to curb corruption and stamp out abuse.  
 
Some of the checks outlined as effective within the 6 jurisdictions are listed 
below: 
 
1. In the jurisdictions of Sweden, Denmark, New Zealand and Quebec it was 
shown that a larger parliament made for a better committee system 
because it ensured there were sufficient numbers to populate the 
committees with little strain being placed on any one part.192  
 
2. All the jurisdictions had Special Independent Commissions of Inquiry and 
mention was made of Queensland where such an enquiry led to the 
imprisonment of a Police Commissioner and 4 State Ministers. 193 
 
3. British Colombia implemented an especially powerful check on its 
members, which allowed for the electorate to dismiss any member of 
parliament in-between elections which was a significant way to assure 
accountability of each member to the people.194  
 
                                                        
188 The Constitution Unit, “Checks and Balances in Single Chamber Parliaments: a Comparative 
Study” [Online] (URL: https://www.ucl.ac.uk/spp/publications/unit-publications/24.pdf ) 
189 Ibid. The Unit looked at the countries of Sweden, Denmark, New Zealand and the provinces of 
Queensland, Quebec and British Colombia. 
190 Ibid, p. 6  
191Ibid 
192 Ibid, p.34 
193 Ibid, p. 36 
194 Ibid 
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4. While the Executive of all the jurisdictions was composed of members 
from the parliament, Sweden was the only jurisdiction, which sought to 
create a more distinct separation by replacing those members with 
substituted members and taking the right to vote from the Ministers even 
though they retained their seat in the parliament. Notwithstanding, this 
did not excuse those ministers from responding to questions and to 
debate bills.195 
 
5. In every jurisdiction it was concluded that a properly functioning 
committee system to review legislation and to initiate independent 
investigations as a check on new laws, review of old laws and on 
government practice was a powerful mechanism in a unicameral 
parliament.196     
 
6. In Denmark and Sweden the powers of the majority are annealed in 
favour of the minority members. Some of these procedural rights in 
Sweden are as follows: “one third of the chamber can send a report back to 
a committee for further consideration. One tenth of MP’s can request a vote 
of no confidence. One third of a committee can request information and 
opinions from public authorities.”197 
 
7. All jurisdictions have as part of their standard process, pre-legislative 
scrutiny processes as a safeguard to producing quality legislation.198  
 
8. All jurisdictions have either retained or implemented the Westminster 
system of question time which allows its members and ministers to be 
                                                        
195 Ibid, p. 36-37 
196 Ibid, p. 37 
197 Ibid, p. 38 
198 Ibid 
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questioned on government policy and is of great assistance to the 
minority rule in checking the majority.199  
 
9. External checks by way of ombudsmen and auditors is provided in all 
jurisdictions. Some of the ombudsmen, e.g. in Sweden have the power to 
launch independent investigations and can request disciplinary action 
against officials or prosecute for breach of duty. The auditors not only 
conduct financial audits but have a wider mandate to review the economy 
and the efficiency and effectiveness of government programmes. 200  
The Unit observed that for those jurisdictions (New Zealand and Queensland) 
which were suggesting either a return to bicameralism or found that no change 
had been evident in that jurisdiction, it was due largely to the fact, that the 
introduction of unicameralism was not simultaneously accompanied with 
parliamentary and constitutional reforms. 
 
This report is instructive to this discourse as it provides a relevant context in 
which the Saint Lucian design can be tailored to suit. Whether the Upper House 
is to be maintained or abolished for the good of the parliament and the country 
will be discussed at chapter 5. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
199 Ibid 
200 Ibid, p. 39 
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CHAPTER 5 
Recommendations  
As has been canvassed in this discourse, Saint Lucia is a complex jurisdiction, 
straddling a system with has been informed by two world perspectives; one 
based on the notion of a free Englishman and the other, on the notion of an 
enslaved African. This has resulted in a subtle tension in the underbelly of the 
country, stemming out of its mixed heritage and misunderstood expectations.   
 
In order to rise above this tension, the country must pave a new path, all its own, 
to a new constitution and a new way of being, which will engender in its people a 
feeling of ownership and understanding of a constitution informed by their own 
ideas and ideals.   
 
This chapter will examine the recommendations in the Report made in relation 
to the change from a monarchy to a presidential system and the transformation 
that should be made to the parliament, taking account of all best practices and 
the avoidance of the obstacles discussed in chapters 1 & 3.   
 
1. That the country should become a Republic with a President as its Head of 
State nominated and approved by both Houses of Parliament.201 There 
may be a tendency to idealize a Republic, seen only through an American 
lens, which has not suffered the ignominy of other presidential regimes. 
Since the Report did not recommend a complete break with the 
Westminster system by the implementation of a full Republic as in the 
United States, it would seem relatively easy to install a President for the 
Governor-General as he would be merely ceremonial, with much the same 
powers as the Governor General under the constitution. There should be 
no need to increase those powers save to import that conventional 
practice which has been established in Britain for the Prime Minister to 
                                                        
201 Supra, fn. 1, p. 26 and House of Commons, “Political and Constitutional Reform Committee: 
The UK Constitution” [Online](URL: https://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons-
committees/political-and-constitutional-reform/The-UK-Constitution.pdf)  
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inform the President weekly of the happenings of the government. This 
will give the President an opportunity to invoke his retained power to 
advise and to warn, a function that should not be side-lined and 
underestimated by any government. The move to a Presidency would 
severe the last colonial cord with Britain and would be seen as a symbolic 
move to real, unfettered independence. 
 
However, conversion to a full republic with an elected president may 
prove to be too cost prohibitive for a small country with limited 
resources.202 
 
2. The independence of parliament can be maintained in four ways: 
(i) Through the establishment of robust committees made up of 
members of both Houses, together with independent persons 
from outside the House, including relevant experts to review 
the work of the Executive;203 
(ii) These committees should have the power to summon Ministers 
and Public Servants and call for any documents deemed 
necessary in their assessment and examination of the works of 
the departments of government. Once their Reports are 
submitted to the House they should be published and tabled for 
debate within one (1) month of submission.204  
(iii) Committee members once appointed should enjoy security of 
office for the duration of the parliament. In that way they 
would not be subjected to political machinations and could 
freely engage in the process without fear of reprisal. 
(iv) Members of the House appointed to Ministerial office should 
resign their seat in the House and that seat taken by their 
                                                        
202 Supra, fn. 111, p.102 
203 M. Basdeo, “The Challenges Facing Committee Systems in Bicameral and Unicameral 
Parliaments in the Commonwealth Caribbean: A Comparison of Dominica and Trinidad and 
Tobago” Chp. 5, p. 270 [Online](URL: 
http://uwispace.sta.uwi.edu/dspace/bitstream/handle/2139/41087/MaukeshBasdeo_AB.pdf?s
equence=1&isAllowed=y)   
204 Ibid 
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running mate in the election. The Ministers would, 
nevertheless, still be subjected to question time and required 
to entertain debates, but would lose their right to vote. This 
would essentially increase the numbers in the House qualified 
to sit on committees.  
 
3. Members to be appointed to ministerial positions should be allowed to 
undergo a scrutiny process similar to the United States where they will be 
examined for suitability to serve in the cabinet to ensure that the best 
qualified persons are appointed to the posts. That being said, because of 
the size of the parliament and the political culture of selecting candidates 
based on popularity it may be difficult to source suitably qualified 
members within the two Houses. This can be cured by allowing the Prime 
Minister to select a limited number of members for nomination outside 
the Parliament as is done in the United States. This will therefore widen 
the pool available to the Prime Minister. He would thus have the option to 
select persons from both Houses as well as persons outside the House, as 
is permissible with the selection of a Speaker.205  
 
4. Whether the senate is retained in a bicameral parliament or subsumed 
into the House of Assembly to create a unicameral parliament is of little 
importance if the necessary checks and balances are not put in place to 
ensure accountability of the legislature. If that is effectively achieved then 
the usefulness of the senate will be realised and its purpose solidified. As 
the members of the senate will be forming the greater part of the 
committees, the Report suggests that there should be an increase in its 
numbers, with the majority still being retained by the ruling party in the 
House. The Report does not however address the corresponding increase 
that must simultaneously occur in the House in order that the Senate does 
not outnumber the parliament, thus creating the potential to gridlock the 
                                                        
205 Supra, fn. 2, S. 35(2)  
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Executive and the parliament, defeating the very notion of flexibility 
inherent in the system.  
 
While increasing the numbers of both Houses would inevitably increase 
the recurring expenditure of the government, its resultant benefit would 
be the greater efficiency of parliament, which in the long term would 
redound to the benefit of the entire country, not just financially but also 
politically in increasing the confidence of the electorate in the workings 
and results of parliament. Within that makeup there should be the 
appointment of more interest groups such as the National Youth Council, 
the Churches, Environmental groups, Chamber of Commerce, Agricultural 
and Tourism sector; and they should be a number equal or almost equal 
to the majority rule. Like committee members, senators should enjoy 
tenure of office for the life of the parliament so that no matter which side 
of the political divide they may fall they will suffer no fear of removal and 
will be able, therefore, to conduct the business of the senate and 
parliament as nearly independent and impartial as humanly possible.       
 
5.  The relationship between the cabinet and public administration must be 
reviewed:  
(i) The fact that the appointment of a Police Commissioner 
cannot be effected without the strict approval of the 
candidate by the Prime Minister leaves a strong suggestion 
and strong evidence that therein lies the potential for grave 
abuse.206 
                                                        
206 It was alleged that former Prime Minister Stephenson King had supported the then Police 
Commissioner in “leaving no stone unturned” in catching criminals in what was called “Operation 
Restore Confidence” following a spate of killings in the country. In the said operation 5 of the 12 
men shot by police were killed and none of the police was prosecuted:  “PM: Investigators allege 
St. Lucia police had ‘Death List,’” [Online] (URL: https://www.yahoo.com/news/pm-
investigators-allege-st-lucia-police-had-death-010147965.html?ref=gs) and [Online] (URL: 
https://www.yahoo.com/news/pm-investigators-allege-st-lucia-police-had-death-
010147965.html?ref=gs).  
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(ii) The hand of the Prime Minister in the appointment of the 
Public Service Commission207 is sufficient evidence to the 
people that the danger for nepotism and victimisation can 
and is inherent in that system. 
In both instances these two Commissions should be independent of 
any interference by the Prime Minister. The control of these 
Commissions does little to lend itself to better governance. Its current 
process opens more doors than it closes for potential abuse and leaves 
the people with a growing feeling of unease that the government has its 
hand in every facet of the country, with the power to elevate or 
deprecate at any time. It might be worth subjecting the intended Police 
Commissioner to the scrutiny of the Senate and the members of the 
Public Service Commission receiving the approval of both the Prime 
Minister and Leader of the Opposition. Consequently, appointments 
will be based on credentials and not favours to supporters.    
 
6. There is no immediate or urgent need to limit the term of Prime 
Ministers. Due to the size of the population the pool of persons eligible to 
become Prime Minister is far smaller than in the United Kingdom or the 
United States. Further, this recommendation by the people has stemmed 
out of a frustration to remove what was seen as egomaniacal Prime 
Ministers who had too much power. With the implementation of some of 
the measures above to strengthen the parliament and cause it to work as 
it was intended this would be sufficient to pacify the people that there is 
little justification to legislate such a provision. Further, Saint Lucia has 
seen more good come out of the almost unbroken succession to the seat 
of Prime Minister with men like Sir John Compton in the long term policy 
decisions and development plans undertaken by him and his party.  
 
7. Making illegal the change of allegiance by members in the House should 
not be allowed. As a powerful check on the Prime Minister it is invaluable. 
                                                        
207 Supra, fn. 2, S. 85(1) 
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A re-education of the people would be important to have them 
understand this vital safeguard for them. This power can be easily 
checked by a demand being made by the legislature and/or the people for 
the removal of non-performing or corrupt politicians. It is important to 
remember that the parliament does not recognise political parties and 
whereas it may be understood that persons often vote the man and the 
party, it is necessary that the electorate be made to understand that a 
member elected to a constituency represents more than just that 
constituency but the whole country, and any charge laid against him 
should not be for the simple fact that he changed his allegiance but as to 
why he felt the need to so. Members must be allowed to protest within the 
House acts of corruption and other breaches of the trust of the people by 
the government without having to face an election. After all, such protest 
would be for the people. And is it not that members are elected to best 
represent the interest of the people even if the people may not always see 
the benefit of those interests? This matter has been a very emotive one in 
Saint Lucia, it having only occurred once, in the manner it did, since 
independence. If a member is found to have acted contrary to good faith 
and changed his allegiance for personal gain then a charge should 
undoubtedly follow, and once proved, should result in the expulsion from 
the House of that member. This can be done by any member supported by 
a 2/3 vote in the House or by petition by a representative number of the 
people. 
 
8. The Public Accounts Committee is so important to the economic health of 
the country that it should be entrenched within the constitution and not 
just part of the Standing Orders of the House. It should always be chaired 
by a member of the Opposition with an equal number of members from 
both sides. The finances of a State are too important to be trifled with by 
assuring a majority to the ruling party. 
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9. The Ombudsman should be given the power to investigate etc. as in 
Sweden, and his reports published and debated before the House within 3 
months of submission. 
 
10. The Integrity Commission must require a declaration by each member of 
the House within 1 month of taking office and every year thereafter. Non-
compliance should result in the suspension of the member without pay 
until the declaration is submitted. Such a draconian sanction is necessary 
to insulate the parliament against corruption and to demonstrate to the 
people the seriousness which the government places upon its integrity. 
Members who fail to remedy the breach should be subjected to a charge 
being laid before the House and if found wanting expelled and their seat 
made vacant and open to election. This strict compliance will ensure that 
all persons seeking high office must be sure to have their affairs in order 
prior to taking up office and from then on during their life in public office.  
 
Further, it will place a greater responsibility on the Party under which 
these members run to check them both before and after elections, as the 
loss of one member could mean the loss of an entire government.  
 
Will changing the model of government change the system? 
This thesis set out to prove that the system of government in Saint Lucia is no 
longer suited to its purpose due to its multiple abuses, and that only a revision of 
that model to some hybrid could cure the ills that had arisen.  
 
What has in fact been proved is that it is not so much the system that is flawed 
but men, and as men have found more and more ways to subvert the processes 
and act against the good will of the people in wielding their power, and the intent 
of the constitution undermined, better and greater checks must be placed on the 
potential distortion of that power.  
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There is little that the author can see as fundamentally wrong with the 
Westminster system. That is not to say that it is perfect and does not now 
require some improvement, but more accurately, the system works in theory 
much more incisively than in practice. In fact, the Westminster system has been 
nothing if not innovative over the last 800 years in keeping pace with the needs 
of the British people. It is and has been an evolving system, and though the 20th 
century has seen its least number of reforms, change is not unknown to it. Even 
Whitehall has seen the need to revise some of its points.  
 
There is no utopian model that can be transposed or created that man will not 
find some way of corrupting if that is his intent. What the framers of any 
constitution must do is to build a system that is not dependent on the goodness 
of man but a system that understands the psyche of the people it is building that 
system around. Montesquieu was of the view that: 
   “Laws should be adapted to the people for whom they are framed…,to the nature 
and principle of each government,…to the climate of each country, to the quality of 
its soil, to its situation and extent, to the principal occupation of the natives…….: 
they should have relation to the degree of liberty which the constitution will bear, 
to the religion of the inhabitants, to their inclinations, riches, numbers, commerce, 
manners and customs…..” 208   
 
Based on the Report of the Reform Committee, it is clear, that save for the move 
to a nominated President, the Westminster system, by and large will remain 
intact with its institutions merely strengthened to give greater effect to the 
workings of parliament under that system. This will ultimately curb abuses and 
act as a shield against the domination of a majority rule parliamentary executive. 
It is evident for the free-flow of change and development to occur, particularly in 
less advanced democracies that there must be flexibility in its constitution so as 
to avoid deadlock, but in the end, the integrity of that constitutional system will 
depend as much on its original design as it does on the intelligent and 
magnanimous application of its parts.        
 
                                                        
208 Supra fn. 10, p. 3 
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Can a hybrid model of government be successfully implemented?         
The hybrid suggested can be quite easily implemented with little change to the 
overall structure and appearance of the parliament or the  political landscape of 
Saint Lucia. It has been called for by the people and the foundation for its 
restructure are already largely in place.  
 
A hybrid would seem to be the happier option considering the evidence that the 
United Kingdom herself is seeking reform within her own model and even 
traditional, strict republics are recreating themselves by converging the two.209 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
209 Supra, fn. 111, p. 117  
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CONCLUSION 
An examination of the constitution of Saint Lucia reveals that change is 
necessary.  
 
Whether Saint Lucia chooses a President or retains its monarchical head will do 
little to transform the political environment but it may succeed in cutting the last 
vestige of colonial dependence. The suggestion in the Report to move to a 
presidential republic was born out of a strong desire to wrest some of the power 
from what was seen as Prime Ministerial monarchs and place it in the hands of 
an elected President. This was a suggestion coming out of little understanding of 
the dangers that could lie in that type of system. Even Bagehot recognised the 
futility that could arise in such an environment: 
 
“The American Government calls itself a Government of the supreme people: but at 
a quick crisis, the time when a sovereign power is most needed, you cannot FIND 
the supreme people. You have got a Congress elected for one fixed period, going out 
perhaps by fixed instalments, which cannot be accelerated or retarded-you have a 
President chosen for a fixed period, and immovable during that period: all the 
arrangements are for stated times. There is no elastic element, everything is rigid, 
specified, dated. Come what may, you can quicken nothing, and can retard nothing. 
You have bespoken your Government in advance, and whether it suits you or not, 
whether it works well or works ill, whether it is what you want or not, by law you 
must keep it.”210  
 
Writers like Sargentich suggest that this supposed gridlock is a myth, for it is 
most infrequent and a solution is often found. After all, Ronald Regan, a 
Republican, he contends, was able to pass his economic plan in a largely 
democratic House.211 His position though does appear to be based on the largely 
unchallenged and stable constitutional design of the United States which would 
                                                        
210 Supra, fn. 52, p. 33 
211 Supra, fn. 107, p 586-587 
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appear to be the only republic in the world that has not been riven by social and 
political discord. 
 
Maybe the writer and the electorate have been brainwashed “in the rank urine of 
British culture”212 with little understanding of how colonial governance has 
found its way into the constitution and rituals of an independent nation213 or 
that the system given wholesale to us was an attempt to steer us away from 
“revolutionary transformation,”214; but little economic or political gain can be 
achieved by removing one ceremonial head for another, but it cannot be ill for 
the people to substitute the one they were given for the one which they have 
chosen. It cannot be ill for the people to finally stand on an independent platform 
away from the shadow of the United Kingdom though, for a developing State, it 
may be only symbolic.  
 
While the recommendations of the committee may bring useful change it cannot 
be thought that the system, of its own, will bring the change desired. It has been 
shown that a parliamentary system has been one of the most stable in the world 
but this cannot be in isolation of other determinants215 such as countries that 
maybe highly polarized, countries where there are high incidences of human 
rights abuses or a corrupt police force, extreme poverty and other social ills. 
Parliamentary government is not “a panacea for stable governance.”216  In 
conjunction with constitutional reform there must be, in addition, changes to the 
social and institutional structures within that community. And it is for this 
reason that recommendations for reform must extend beyond the parliament to 
the independence of the Police Force, to the Public Service, the largest employer 
in the country and to the Ombudsman to increase and strengthen its role as well 
as the Integrity Commission to ward off corrupt practices in all areas of public 
life.  
 
                                                        
212 Supra, fn. 7, p. 96 
213 Ibid, p. 96 
214 Ibid, p. 100 
215 Supra, fn. 8 and Supra, fn. 107, p. 582  
216 Supra, fn. 8, p. 5 
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And finally, while the people call for reform they must never forget and must 
believe in their inalienable right to use the instrument that is the constitution to 
restrain their government217 and to use their voice and their vote in doing so.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
217 Patrick Henry (1736-1799) Patriot, Lawyer and Orator  
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